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I. Introduction
Private employees have diminished expectations of personal privacy
in the modem workplace. Except where certain narrowly defined funda-
mental rights are implicated, private employees have little constitutional'
protection for their privacy. This Note explores constitutional protec-
tions of privacy in the private workplace, based on either the federal or
California Constitution.
Part II.A discusses the federal constitutional right to privacy based
on modem substantive due process protections derived from the Four-
teenth Amendment. Beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut2 in 1965,
the United States Supreme Court rediscovered substantive due process as
a viable source of constitutional protection for fundamental liberty inter-
ests. The Court has applied modem substantive due process not to fun-
damental economic or contractual rights, but to more personal marital
and procreational rights? Modem substantive due process has been cir-
cumscribed both by narrow application to a few substantive rights based
on traditional family relationships, and by balancing the individual's lib-
erty interest against the government's interests. If a court considers the
liberty interest among the few protected "fundamental" rights, the gov-
emnment must have a compelling interest the achievement of which ne-
cessitates the government's restriction of that liberty interest.4
1. This Note addresses only constitutional privacy protections. Many common law and
statutory protections are available as well.
For statutory provisions, see, e.g., Kurt H. Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the
1990's, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 551, 566-70 (1988); RICHARD F. HIxSON, PRIVACY IN A PUBLIC
SOCIETY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 184-229 (1987).
For common law protections, see, e.g., Decker, supra, at 570-73; George B. Trubow, In-
formation Law Overview, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815 (1985); HIxsoN, supra, at 52-70, 133-
156; IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SURVEIL-
LANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 25-37 (Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, Inc. 1989).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. For the pre-Griswold history of this evolution, see JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW § 11.3, at 342-60 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988), and cases'cited therein.
4. This is not an impossible standard for the government to meet: For example, in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516 (1989), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
150-54 (1973), the Court found that the state's interest in protecting potential human life out-
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Federal courts usually analyze workplace privacy rights not under
the Fourteenth Amendment's strict substantive due process guarantees,
but under the Fourth Amendment's lax guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure. Part II.B points out that this threshold choice of
analytical framework generally determines the outcome in this substan-
tive area.
Part II.C covers the federal "state action" requirement. Substantive
due process rights under the federal constitution only exist against the
government,5 which must have acted or regulated in a way offensive to
the protected rights. Part IV.A explains that the California constitu-
tional privacy right, in contrast, needs no state action trigger. Although
some of the state action doctrines apply to private employers acting in a
governmental capacity or acting in concert with some governmental
agency or official, the federal state action requirement sharply curtails
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process
protections to private employers.
Employees may rely on state constitutions to bridge gaps in federal
constitutional protection, however, as addressed in part III. California is
among several states that have explicit constitutional privacy rights,
some linked with search and seizure clauses, and some standing indepen-
dently. These state constitutional privacy rights provide invigorated pro-
tection to private employees seeking redress for invasions in the
workplace.
Part III.B discusses federalism concerns. California has applied its
privacy protections more liberally than the United States Supreme Court
has applied comparable federal constitutional rights.' The Supreme
Court has no constitutional objections to such discrepant applications.7
As with the federal courts' selection of a Fourth Amendment analy-
sis for workplace privacy issues such as drug testing, instead of a Four-
teenth Amendment due process analysis, the state court standard of
review can determine outcomes. California appeals courts have split on
weighs an adult woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, when the fetus becomes viable
outside the womb.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (against state governments); U.S. CoNST. amend. V
(against the federal goverment). See, eg., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), for incorpo-
ration of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees against state governments into the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause against the federal government.
6. Compare Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784-89 (Cal.
1981) (applying strict scrutiny to legislative restrictions on state funding for abortions, and
overturning these restrictions) with Webster, 492 U.S. at 508-09 (reiterating that no constitu-
tional right to government funding for abortions, even though government constitutionally
cannot restrict right to have an abortion).
7. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 336 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)); see William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 548
(1986). See infra text accompanying note 214, on independent state grounds.
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this crucial issue, as detailed in part III.C. These courts have treated
state constitutional privacy rights in the workplace with two distinct ana-
lytical approaches. Most courts test violations of the state right to pri-
vacy with strict scrutiny, but a state appeals panel recently developed a
reasonableness/balancing test closer to that used with search and seizure
provisions.8
As many individuals' social experiences become increasingly secu-
larized and consequently centered around the workplace, concerns over
balancing employers' interests in protecting their property and improv-
ing worker productivity, and employees' interests in personal privacy,
demand innovative legal protections. Parts IV.B and C explore the re-
spective interests of employers and employees. With increasing popula-
tion and crowding in urban areas, privacy has become more precious and
its absence more noticeable. The fundamentality of personal privacy in
the Anglo-American cultural tradition may justify its increased protec-
tion, at a constitutional level, for which individuals need look increas-
ingly to state constitutions. The federal constitution should also be
brought up to date, with an explicit privacy right like that guaranteed in
the California Constitution.
II. Federal Constitutional Protections
A. Modern Substantive Due Process
1. History of the Penumbral Privacy Right and Its Incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment
The federal constitution contains no explicit right to privacy. The
Supreme Court has inferred a federal constitutional right to privacy from
various Bill of Rights protections and from the basic guarantee of fair-
ness that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides.9 This right to privacy is actually more a right to personal
autonomy than a right to keep certain information secret. 10 The substan-
tive areas covered by the right, such as sexual and marital choices, are
narrowly circumscribed both by traditional cultural values and by an ex-
acting standard for what is fundamentally private.
8. Compare Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990)
(finding drug testing current employee without suspicion unconstitutional under CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1) with Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990) (finding drug testing job applicant without suspi-
cion constitutional using mid-level review and following federal search and seizure models).
9. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (stating that government power over collec-
tion and distribution of data not necessarily protected by right to privacy); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that bank records, even of customers not involved in
criminal activity, are fair game).
1II0
The landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut" invalidated state
statutes that penalized both the use of contraceptives and the provision of
any advice or assistance in using contraceptives. 2 The majority found
"that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations, ... [that] create zones of privacy." 3 The Court located
these penumbral zones between the lines of the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, 4 which each shelter some individual
zone from government intrusion.
Many First Amendment guarantees implicate personal autonomy.
The First Amendment protects an individual's prerogative to express
non-defamatory, non-obscene speech and to choose religious beliefs
freely." As Griswold pointed out,16 the amendment has protected par-
ents' right to choose schools for their children,1 7 the right to study a
language other than English in school,18 and the right to voluntarily as-
sociate,19 whether such association be political or not.20 The First
Amendment guards the sanctity of an individual's beliefs against coer-
cion or censor, 21 even though the beliefs are not expressed in words.22
The Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs, which the Constitu-
tion considers personal rather than civic.23
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. Id at 480.
13. Id. at 484.
14. Id
15. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .... U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
intricacies of defamation and obscenity jurisprudence are beyond the scope of this Note.
16. 381 U.S. at 482.
17. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
20. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
21. See, eg., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (stating that decision turned on
government funding of speech, not speech itself); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) (maintaining that doctors cannot be forced to tell patients about
to have abortions that life begins at conception; such a statutory provision is "designed not to
inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether").
22. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (explaining that flag burning is expressive con-
duct that implicates the First Amendment).
Griswold's reliance on the respect for privacy implied by the respect for speech is ironic, in
that the Supreme Court has not limited speech protections by content the way it has privacy
protections. Compa re National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir.
1984) (disallowing a statute prohibiting homosexual teachers to talk about or advocate homo-
sexuality), affid, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (uphold-
ing a statute aimed against actual homosexual activity between consenting adults). The
Constitution protects the talk but not the action.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Free Exercise Clause). See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990).
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The Third Amendment's proscription of quartering troops in pri-
vate homes, and the Fourth Amendment's protection of the sanctity of
individuals' "persons, houses, papers, and effects," both contribute to the
Griswold penumbral zones of privacy.24 The Fifth Amendment's right
against self-incrimination" places another aspect of personhood beyond
government reach.
The Griswold majority used the Ninth Amendment to support the
possibility of constitutional guarantees that are not explicit.26 Justice
Goldberg's concurrence emphasized that the amendment's allusion to
non-enumerated rights indicates that the Constitution must allow for
such rights, or the Ninth Amendment would serve no purpose.27
Justices Harlan and Goldberg initially located the source of the sub-
stantive right to privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, rather than in the majority's penumbras.28 Their concur-
rences more readily admitted to constructing a new area of substantive
due process. The majority, however, was openly leery of the repudiated
Lochner29 era of economic substantive due process, during which the
Due Process Clause legitimized individual liberty at the expense of social
justice.30 Harlan and Goldberg did not need "penumbras" to find that
the Connecticut statute violated, without due process of law, a funda-
mental liberty-the right to choose contraception. Harlan argued that
due process protections will be more potent, and applicable to different
unfair intrusions, if they remain general, fluid, and capable of future de-
velopment.31 That is, if due process is tied to general fairness rather than
to more specific rights, it will serve as a broader, more malleable
safeguard.
24. U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Part II.B, infra, discusses the federal Fourth Amendment protections in detail.
25. "[N]or shall any person... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."
27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-94 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's dissent
characterized the Ninth Amendment as a mere companion to the Tenth, but offered no satis-
factory explanation for the Framers' redundancy. Id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 497-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. The majority kept clear of "economic problems, busi-
ness affairs, or social conditions," characterizing them as legislative territory. See also No-
WAK ET AL., supra note 3, discussing the history of substantive due process.
31. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500-01 (Harlan, J., concurring). "[The 'incorporation' doctrine
may be used to restrict the reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process .... [T]he proper
constitutional inquiry ... is whether ... the enactment violates basic %alues 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 . . . . The Due Process
Clause... stands ... on its own bottom." Id. at 500. See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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By 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Court acquiesced to the
Harlan/Goldberg analysis and no longer invoked penumbral zones of
protection.32 The Roe majority was comfortable with the right to pri-
vacy being a substantive due process right, located in the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee: "[nor] shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'33
2. Privacy Under Equal Protection
Privacy cases have occasionally been decided on equal protection
grounds. Unequal treatment of a class of people can trigger strict judicial
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause if
a suspect class or a fundamental right is involved.34 In constitutional
privacy cases, the requirement that some identifiable class be treated un-
equally is seldom met. A privacy invasion that did affect a class was
embodied in the statute overturned in Eisenstadt v. Baird that prohibited
only unmarried persons from obtaining contraceptives.35
Chief Justice Stone's concurrence in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson36 pointed out a potential drawback to using equal protection
rather than due process grounds when both are available: Equal protec-
tion raises a narrower objection because it invalidates the inequality of
application of the complained-of statute or other action, not the statute or
action itself. The statute in Skinner penalized only certain theft crimes
with forced sterilization. 37 As Stone argued, the problem with the statute
is its fundamentally unfair choice of penalties, not its unequal application
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (endorsing the "right to privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty .... as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people
.... ); Mark Silverstein, Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989
U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 223 (1989); Martha M. Ezzard, State Constitutional Privacy Rights Post
Webster-Broader Protection Against Abortion Restrictions?, 67 DENV. U. L. REv. 401, 403
(1990).
33. See supra note 32; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Locating the constitutional right to
privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment also exempts that right from the debate over incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights. Further discussion of the incorporation doctrine is beyond the scope
of this Note.
34. For discussion on suspect classes, see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried persons). Cf San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (discussing criteria for suspect
classes).
On fundamental rights, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (upholding the
right to marry).
35. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
36. 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring).
37. Note that Skinner was a 1942 decision, well before the era of the Warren Court. Inex-
plicably, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, was not of-
fered as an alternate ground.
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of this choice.3" But under an equal protection analysis, the statute could
be rejuvenated by merely making sterilization the penalty for all theft
crimes, instead of eliminating sterilization as a punishment.
Another reason equal protection analysis rarely appears in right-to-
privacy cases is that the Supreme Court has declined to recognize the
indigent as a suspect class.39 The abortion funding cases are illustra-
tive.' Although a woman has a privacy right against government inter-
ference into a decision as fundamentally personal as whether to have an
abortion, the same woman does not have an affirmative right to govern-
ment funding for that abortion,41 even if the woman's health is
threatened.42 That is, the government cannot constitutionally prevent
poor women from having abortions, but it does not have to pay for
them. 3 The contention that denying government funding effectively de-
prives poor women of access to abortions, has not persuaded the
Supreme Court to find a denial of equal protection.'
3. The Substantive Scope of the Federal Privacy Right
The substantive areas that the federal constitutional right to privacy
protects are limited by mainstream cultural values. For example, homo-
sexual activity between consenting adults is not afforded the protection
that heterosexual activity between consenting married adults is.45 Justice
Goldberg's Griswold concurrence stresses that the Court "must look to
the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine
whether a principle is 'so rooted [there]... as to be ranked as fundamen-
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
39. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
40. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Ezzard, supra note 32, at 403.
41. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464. Note that this perceived absence of a fundamental right dictates the Court's use of a
rational basis test rather than a compelling interest test. See Harris v. MeRae, 448 U.S. 297.
42. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297.
43. In the criminal procedure context, the Supreme Court has used the opposite rationale,
where the constitutional rights are explicit, to confirm an indigent defendant's absolute consti-
tutional right to a lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). When the right to a
lawyer becomes grounded in substantive due process rather than in an explicit right, however,
the Court is less willing to grant the right. Compare Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(extending right to counsel to first appeal, which is statutorily but not constitutionally guaran-
teed) with Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (maintaining that the right to counsel
does not extend to second, discretionary appeals).
44. As discussed in part III infra, this is one of many areas in which California's constitu-
tion grants greater protection than its federal counterpart. See Committee to Defend Reprod.
Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
45. For a discussion on consenting homosexual activity, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986); see also Rahel E. Kent, Comment, Imposition of the Justices' Own Moral
Choices-Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), 9 WHITrIER L. REv. 115 (1987); Ira C.
Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 988-89
(1979) (for modem substantive due process, the post-Griswold Court just picked different
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tal.' "I The rights judged fundamental by the Court center around deci-
sions of marriage, procreation,47 and cohabitation,48 but only where the
relationship(s) at issue are structured around the traditional nuclear
family.49
A case's outcome depends on the level of scrutiny the court uses to
evaluate the constitutionality of the privacy invasion. The court's choice
of scrutiny level, in turn, depends on whether the privacy right at issue is
fundamental. Classification of a right as fundamental triggers strict scru-
tiny, whereas a non-fundamental right is tested with a rational basis
test."0 If the court labels a right fundamental, the government must have
a compelling interest to override the right, and the statute or act must be
narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest." A California
court interpreted the Supreme Court's recent employment privacy cases
as requiring a "clear, direct nexus.., between.., the employee's duty
and the ... feared violation" of public safety. 2
rights from the Lochner era; despite Court protestations, its deviation from Lochner substan-
tive due process was no more basic than its content).
National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aft'd, 470
U.S. 903 (1985), easily upheld less than strict scrutiny for discriminations based on sexual
preference, under an equal protection analysis. Id. at 1273. But discriminations based on race
are afforded the strictest scrutiny. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
For a discussion on consenting heterosexual activity, see, e.g., Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). .
46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
47. See, eg., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
48. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (stressing the importance of
keeping family together even though sometimes dysfunctional); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (denying constitutional protection for consensual homosexual activity); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (rejecting privacy protection for right to live together).
Cf ALIDA BRILL, NOBODY'S BUSINESS: PARADOXES OF PRIVACY 121-42 (1990).
50. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 516, 519 (1989). See also Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113; San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); NOWAK ET AL., supra note 3, § 14.3, at 530-43.
Gender discrimination calls for a mid-level test, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976),
though that is beyond the scope of this Note. The level of scrutiny in federal Fourth Amend-
ment analyses has been significantly relaxed, as discussed infra in part II.B.
51. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40. For example, in abortion cases the state can regulate its
interest in potential human life, which becomes compelling at the point of fetal viability. Web-
ster, 492 U.S. 490; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154-55. As for narrow tailoring, a state can
establish mandatory medical procedures only if necessary for a woman's health and safety.
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973).
52. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 630-31 (Ct. App. 1990). This
is a logical reading of Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), because the compel-
ling interest involved is ultimately public safety. But neither of these decisions explicitly calls
for such a "clear, direct nexus."
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Because of the narrow substantive scope of the federal constitutional
right to privacy, the Supreme Court has analyzed issues of workplace
privacy under the rubric of the Fourth Amendment rather than under
substantive due process.53
B. The Fourth Amendment
The jurisprudence of federal search and seizure cases has changed
dramatically in the twenty-eight years between Mapp v. Ohio in 1961,11
and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association and National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab in 1989.15 In 1961, Mapp ex-
tended the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary
rule that enforces the amendment to state courts through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 56 Current Fourth Amendment protections are subject to
so many "special needs" exceptions57 that employees cannot realistically
look to this amendment for protection of their privacy.
In 1967, Katz v. United States ushered in the modem era of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by severing its link to trespass onto tangible
property. Katz declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."58
Under Katz, to determine whether a search was reasonable, the
court considers whether the government's action constituted a "search,"
and if so, whether that search was reasonable. The first prong focuses on
the subject's reasonable expectation of privacy in the activity at issue:
Someone talking loudly in a crowded elevator should not expect confi-
dentiality, whereas someone talking in an enclosed phonebooth has good
53. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Skinner, 489 U.S. 602. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), both allude to the overlap
between constitutional privacy and Fourth Amendment protections, but Katz, 389 U.S. at 350,
is careful to distinguish these areas.
54. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
55. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. See Harlin Ray Dean, Jr., Note,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Bal-
ance, 68 N.C. L. REv. 389, 401-02 (1990).
56. Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 540-41. Under the exclusionary
rule, evidence obtained through an unconstitutionally unreasonable search is inadmissible.
57. See generally Gerald S. Reamey, When "Special Needs" Meet Probable Cause: Deny-
ing the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 295 (1991).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), reviewed the admissibility of evidence
obtained by bugging a public phonebooth. Prior to Katz, this evidence would have been
outside the amendment's scope because the defendant's property was not searched and because
the evidence consisted of intangible communications (phone conversations about bookmak-
ing). Id. at 351-53. Katz dispensed with the trespass linkage, thus effectively opening up pri-
vate land-for example, to air searches-and closing off many searches on public land that
previously had not triggered Fourth Amendment protection. Id. See Silverstein, supra note
32, at 220-21.
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reason to expect it.5 9 If the subject had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy the intrusion is classified as a "search" and the court moves to the
second prong to resolve whether the search was objectively reasonable
and hence permissible. In assessing the second prong, the court looks to
the Fourth Amendment's requirements of probable cause and a valid
warrant' except in specific instances when hot pursuit or other emer-
gency was involved, when the subject had consented to the search, or
when the search was performed immediately incident to an arrest.61 The
absence of a warrant was determinative in Katz, although the Warren
Court all but said the phonebooth bugging would have been reasonable
otherwise.62
Under current Fourth Amendment analysis, the initial inquiry into
whether there was a search protected by the amendment is still based on
the subject's reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, in the 1989
pair of drug testing cases, Skinner and Von Raab, the Court held that
collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that
society has long recognized as reasonable, especially because it implicates
bodily integrity. 63 Von Raab upheld suspicionless, warrantless drug test-
ing of U.S. Customs employees applying for jobs that entailed interdic-
tion of illegal drugs or carrying a weapon.6 The Skinner Court also
found suspicionless, warrantless drug testing constitutional because com-
pelling safety interests outweighed railroad workers' Fourth Amendment
privacy interests.65
To satisfy its initial inquiry in the seizure context, the Court must
find that the person was restrained in such a way that a reasonable per-
son in those circumstances would not feel free to leave.66 The restraint
must also be effective; a defendant who ran from a shouting, pursuing
police officer was not actually "seized" until the officer tackled him.67 In
the workplace, an employee's "normal" restraint of not being able to
59. 389 U.S. at 355-58; see also Lisa Brunn, Comment, Privacy and the Employment Rela-
tionship, 25 Hous. L. REv. 389 (1988). Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz originally pro-
posed the two-prong analysis: Subjectively, did the searchee expect to be acting in private; and
if so, was that expectation objectively reasonable? Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
60. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in part: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause .... "
61. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-57.
63. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
64. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656.
65. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602.
66. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984).
67. California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1550-52 (1991).
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leave during working hours is not a seizure.68
The second Katz prong has been transformed in the past twenty-
four years. Katz found, in the Fourth Amendment, bright-line require-
ments of probable cause and a warrant for most searches.69 In the crimi-
nal and administrative contexts, these requirements have been
superseded by weak, subjective balancing that offers little protection and
in some cases allows searches and seizures without even individualized
suspicion, let alone probable cause or a warrant.70 By 1989, a govern-
ment allegation of some "special need" or compelling interest, which
need not be very specific, was enough to eliminate the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements. 7' Justice Marshall's Skinner dissent72 lamented
that the Court majority had now come full circle by finding a "special
need" that obviated a warrant in each of the Fourth Amendment's four
categories: one's person, house, papers, and effects.7 3
In Skinner and Von Raab, the government employer's special needs
for drug testing without a warrant were as follows: The delay of ob-
taining a warrant might result in the loss of evidence because the metabo-
lites that drug tests identify might have passed through an employee's
system by the time he or she was finally tested; and the administrative
complexity of obtaining a warrant was "unwieldly." 74 Marshall's dissent
in Skinner showed that a warrant is still eminently practical. He con-
tended that drug testing entails two separate searches. The first is the
bodily intrusion to take the sample, and the second is the testing of the
sample, which can reveal extremely personal medical and other informa-
68. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218 ("Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to
move about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law enforcement officials,
but by the workers' voluntary obligations to their employers.").
69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
70. For treatment of searches, see, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (employee drug testing); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (employee drug testing); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
722-23 (1987) (search by employer of employee's office for work-related non-investigatory rea-
sons); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (upholding administrative searches
without probable cause, and warrant need only be presented if searchee so requests).
For a discussion of seizures, see Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481
(1990) (holding suspicionless stops at sobriety checkpoints constitutional).
71. "'A special need [for the evidence], beyond the normal need for law enforcement,'
makes the 'requirement' of probable cause 'impracticable.' "Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987), which quoted New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1985)); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722. The Court
shifts to a balancing analysis, weighing the government's need for the information or physical
evidence, against the subject's privacy interests. See generally Reamey, supra note 57.
72. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 636-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Person: Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-14.
House: Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Papers: O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
Effects: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
74. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24.
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tion. He conceded that the delay argument may overcome the warrant
requirement on the first search-taking the sample; but he pointed out
that such samples can easily be preserved until a proper warrant is ob-
tained for the second search-the actual testing. 5
Von Raab assessed the intrusiveness of a U.S. Customs Service drug-
testing program for candidates for three job categories: front-line drug
interdiction positions, positions that carry a gun, and positions working
with classified information. The Court found the last class too broad, but
upheld the former two, balancing the government's compelling interests
against the employee's privacy interests.76 The Customs Service had
compelling interests in preventing drug use, and more specifically, in
preventing users from receiving promotions; in maintaining public confi-
dence in "front-line interdiction personnel... [with] unimpeachable in-
tegrity and judgment"; in impeding employee corruption such as taking
bribes or stealing; and in ensuring the effectiveness, and hence safety, of
drug-using and non-using employees alike. 7 7 In contrast, the Court be-
lieved that jobs that entail carrying weapons or working with intelligence
bring "a diminished expectation of privacy" with them; that procedural
safeguards such as no direct observation of the employee's urination and
a two-test requirement to check accuracy minimized the intrusion; that
employees had sufficient notice because anyone applying for a designated
position knew in advance that the process included a drug test; and that
only specified drug metabolites were tested for and the employee need
not reveal legitimate drug use unless required to explain a positive test.7"
Von Raab and Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz essen-
tially condone the balancing approach in all civil search and seizure con-
texts, even without individual suspicion and even when the search is as
intrusive as forced urination and drug testing. 79 With non-criminal, ad-
ministrative searches, whether the Court's leniency is limited to heavily
75. Id. at 642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-78 (1989).
77. Id. at 669-70.
78. Id at 668-74. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (employees have reduced
expectations of privacy on job).
79. For a discussion of search context, see Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656; Dean, supra note 55,
at 397-401. For a discussion of seizure, see California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1
(1991) (stating that only a hunch needed-less than Terry reasonable suspicion requirement);
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (upholding sobriety check-
point stops without any suspicion).
In its [Skinner and Von Raab] decisions upholding mass, suspicionless drug-
testing of certain employees in particular safety-sensitive jobs, the Court stressed that
the drug tests were not conducted for ordinary law enforcement purposes, but in-
stead were elements of administrative schemes designed to promote public safety and
enforceable only by job-related sanctions. In contrast, the roadblock inspections up-
held in Sitz were directed at core, classical law enforcement aims: seeking evidence to
use in arresting and prosecuting individuals who violate the laws that criminalize
driving while intoxicated.
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regulated industries is an open question.80
As Marshall argued in his Skinner dissent,"' drug testing does not
uncover "current impairment" that might affect an employee's job per-
formance, but rather tests for recent use. A positive result might indicate
drug use at a non-job-related party on a Friday night, for instance, and
the employee might be perfectly functional long before Monday morning.
The majority opined that any use could indicate on-the-job use. 2 How-
ever, an employer's compelling interest in an employee's drug use should
extend only as far as that use affects the employee's performance for that
employer.8 3 Beyond that legitimate scope, a rule is not tailored narrowly
enough to achieve only that compelling interest.
Skinner approved statutory drug testing for railroad employees in-
volved in an accident. As in Von Raab, the Court found the testing mini-
mally intrusive because direct observation of urination was not
mandated, though it was recommended, and because the testing was to
be performed by an independent medical service in a clinical setting."
Although the government could "learn certain private medical facts that
an employee might prefer not to disclose," the Court found this innocu-
ous in the absence of any showing that the government actually did any-
thing improper with those facts.8 5 Because the railroad industry was
heavily regulated, its employees should have reduced expectations of pri-
vacy. 6 The majority rejected the alternative method for spotting drug
use-relying on supervisors to observe intoxication-speculating that by
Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful
Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 286 (1991).
80. In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Court upheld the constitutionality of
administrative inspections of auto junkyards, even for evidence of criminal activity (stolen cars
and parts). Id. at 716. Pervasive regulation of the industry effectively put junkyard operators
on notice of such searches and obviated warrants. Id. at 711. Thus, warrantless administra-
tive searches without individual suspicion did not violate the owners' reasonable expectations
of privacy.
The distinction between administrative and criminal searches is blurred because adminis-
trative searches usually seek evidence of crimes. Employee drug testing could be called admin-
istrative, but its results have criminal implications. The Supreme Court encourages this
overlap by relying on criminal search precedents in its administrative search cases. For exam-
ple, Burger, id. at 702, relies on New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding search
of student's purse for drugs) for its "special needs" analysis. See also Burger, 482 U.S. at 724-
25 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority's distinction between administrative andcriminal is illu-
sory because the only evidence sought in the searches at issue is that of crimes).
81. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
82. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631-32.
83. The need for a compelling interest to outweigh a fundamental privacy right is dis-
cussed in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 (1973); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
84. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625.
85. Id. at 626 n.7.
86. Id. at 627. See Dean, supra note 55, at 392.
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the time such an observation was made, the damage would be done.87
The Court thought that the compelling public interests of obliterating
drug use and preventing accidents would be best served by suspicionless
testing, especially where even an accident might not lead to individual-
ized suspicion.88
The Skinner majority endorsed the deterrence rationale for suspi-
cionless testing, arguing that the threat of testing will not chill drug use
unless its timing is unforeseen. 9 Justice Stevens's concurrence disagreed
with this point only: Stevens observed that an employee hardly goes to
work expecting a crash and consequent drug test, and that if the danger
of an accident and personal safety has not already deterred the employee
from using drugs, the specter of job loss probably would not either.90
Justice Marshall's dissent punctuated Stevens's latter point with a won-
derful analogy: "Under the majority's deterrence rationale, people who
skip school or work to spend a sunny day at the zoo will not taunt the
lions because their truancy or absenteeism might be discovered in the
event they are mauled." 9
Justice Scalia, often wary about the Court's delving into politics,
takes the majority to task in his Von Raab dissent, for permitting the
Customs Service to use drug testing purely to set an example that the
government is "getting tough on drugs" by cleaning up its own front
line.92 He counters that the only examples the government is setting are
that the "end justifies the means" and that the government's image has
priority over its citizens' civil liberties.93 Both Scalia and Marshall warn
that the antidrug bandwagon 94 threatens to flatten important constitu-
tional protections. "Precisely because the need for action against the
drug scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is great. History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come
in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
87. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629-30. This is a rather specious observation, since the testing
the Skinner majority approved was to take place after accidents.
88. Id. at 628-30.
89. Id See also Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 465 U.S. 444 (1990).
90. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (Stevens, J., concurring). Robert Berkeley Harper, Has the
Replacement of "Probable Cause" with "Reasonable Suspicion" Resulted in the Creation of the
Best of All Possible Worlds?, 22 AKRON L. REv. 13, 37-39 (1988), argues that the public's
interests in law enforcement and protection of police should not extend to situations where
there is no longer any immediate danger or to investigations of past crimes.
91. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 653 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, at 686-87 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Id Justice Scalia "think[s] it obvious that this justification is unacceptable; that the
impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism,
even symbolism for so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an
otherwise unreasonable search." Id
94. See id at 668; Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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endure."95
The majority's new balancing approach is beholden to political cur-
rents because of its inherent subjectivity. 6 A primary goal of the prob-
able cause and warrant requirements is objectivity; potential searchees
are protected from over-zealous police, prosecutors, or employers by "de-
tached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. '9 7 Not only will absence of a
bright line provide no guidance to police or employers, but it may also
reduce the precedential value of decisions based on fact-specific balanc-
ing.98 The Court's reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab attests to the
potential distortions of the balancing approach, which is nebulous9 9 and
speculative. 100
The logic of these cases is also internally inconsistent. As Marshall
points out in Skinner,10 1 in the majority's initial determination that urine
tests constitute a search (the first prong), it finds urination an extremely
private area in our culture, one discussed only in "euphemisms if... at
all."1"2 Then in its analysis of the search's reasonableness (the second
prong), the majority characterizes even the suggested observation of em-
ployee urination as a "minimal intrusion."1 3 This inconsistency illus-
trates that, in general, Fourth Amendment balancing is a far more
lenient analysis than the strict scrutiny required for fundamental rights
under substantive due process.
C. The State Action Requirement
The major obstacle to applying a federal constitutional privacy right
in the private workplace is the state action requirement. Both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses limit only the actions
95. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. See Dean, supra note 55, at 403-05; Harper, supra note 90, at 37, 41-43. Cf Reamey,
supra note 57, at 330-39 (discussing drug-war politics and the judiciary as the allegedly apoliti-
cal branch).
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967). See also Harper, supra note 90, at 41-
43.
For administrative searches of company premises, the Supreme Court has allowed a neu-
trally devised plan, for selecting which companies will be searched, to substitute for individual-
ized probable cause. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). This, however, is a
different issue from employers' searches of employees, which would fit into the line of cases
represented by New Jersey v. T.L.O., Skinner, and Von Raab.
98. Dean, supra note 55, at 406-07.
99. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 639-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 683 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 652 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 617 (quoting the Von Raab appellate decision, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir.
1987)).
103. Id. at 621-27.
of government, not of private entities.1° The Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, like the rest of the original Bill of Rights, directly circumscribe
conduct by the federal government alone, although both have been ap-
plied to actions by state governments through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.' As for implicit or constructed privacy
rights, substantive due process rights are inferred from the Fourteenth
Amendment's clause, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law."'" 6
The policy rationales that underlie the state action requirement for
federal constitutional rights'017 are federalism and individualism. Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Peterson v. Greenville articulates the latter
clearly:
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors,
to use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational,
arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal relations are
things all entitled to a large measure of protection from govern-
mental interference. This liberty would be overridden, in the name
of equality, if the ... [Fourteenth] Amendment were applied to
governmental and private action without distinction. 08
104. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
13 (1948); Richard I. Lehr & David J. Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Employer
Screening Policies, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 407, 408 (1985).
In addition, for federal jurisdiction not based on diversity of citizenship, a litigant must
show (1) that a federal right was violated or a federal question raised, and (2) that some level of
government was involved or that the private actor acted under color of state or federal law.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 155; David R.
Cochran, Note, The Privacy Expectation: A Comparison of Federal and California Constitu-
tional Standards for Drug Testing in Amateur Athletics, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533, 536
(1990). The government entity involved can be local, state, or federal.
105. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (applying double jeopardy prohibition in
state courts); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying right against self-incrimination in
state courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying Fourth Amendment protections
and the exclusionary rule applied in state courts).
The Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, has not been incorporated and
applies only in federal court. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1984); Brennan, supra note
7, at 545.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). On applicability to the federal gov-
ernment, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
In contrast, violations of California's state constitutional privacy rights are actionable
without any government involvement. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr.
618 (Ct. App. 1990); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Ct. App.
1976). Part IV.A infra discusses the lack of a state action requirement for the California
constitutional privacy right.
107. The Thirteenth Amendment is the exception: The prohibition of slavery can be en-
forced without any government involvement. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
108. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice
Harlan was alluding to equal protection, but the same freedom from government oversight
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The state action requirement also guards states' rights. In addition
to allowing private actors liberty unfettered by government, it aims to
allow state and local governments, rather than the federal government, to
police their own citizens. Basic federalism allows for regional latitude."19
The most obvious category of state action is direct action by govern-
ment officials such as a state university official 1 ° or a sheriff."' The
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' direct-action theory of state action in
Blum v. Yaretsky." 2 Plaintiff Medicaid recipients claimed that their
transfers from high-care facilities to lower-care facilities, without ad-
vance notice or chance for their input, violated their due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 The Court did not consider their
transfers state actions because the pivotal acts that resulted in their trans-
fers were discretionary medical judgments by private doctors, rather than
the resulting changes in plaintiffs' benefits by government bureaucrats." 4
Government applications of statutes, regulations, decisional law,
legal remedies, and theories of relief are state actions.115 For example,
the Court analyzed Skinner under the Fourth Amendment because fed-
eral regulations compelled compliance with railroad safety guidelines,
and though drug testing was not explicitly mandated, "the Government's
encouragement, endorsement, and participation" in the testing was ac-
tive. "6 The regulations also preempted state law and collective bargain-
ing contracts, and allowed test results to be sent to federal railroad
authorities." 7 Thus, the Court found that a private railroad's perform-
ance of drug tests was state action." 8
Where private action is mandated or strongly coerced by state law,
that private action is state action, because the government in effect "has
removed that decision from the sphere of private choice."' 1 9 The Afri-
underlies the state action requirement for federal due process rights. See, e.g., Tarkanian, 488
U.S. at 191.
109. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 191.
110. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179; Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the
Rehnquist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 598 (1991).
111. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitch-
ell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Strickland, supra note 110, at 598.
112. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
113. Id. at 994-96.
114. Id at 1005.
115. See Strickland, supra note 110, at 599-606.
Courts also require scienter: When a private entity acts under color of state law, it must
know of the law, or its action is not state action. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156
(1978).
116. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989).
117. Id. at 615.
118. Id. at 615-16.
119. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963). See Strickland, supra note 110, at
619-20; Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 408; Cochran, supra note 104, at 536.
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can-American plaintiffs in Peterson were refused service at a privately
owned lunch counter, in South Carolina in 1960, because a city ordi-
nance required segregation of local eating facilities by race.120 The ordi-
nance compelled the restaurant manager's action, so the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applied to the otherwise private
action. 121
The mere existence of a statute or regulation is not sufficient for a
finding of state action: The statute must be coercive or leave the private
actor at best a limited escape. 122 In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, de-
fendant warehouse sought to exercise defendant's lien on plaintiff's
household goods-without, according to plaintiff, giving proper no-
tice.123 Plaintiff claimed due process and equal protection infringements,
asserting that the state statute permitting the warehouse to exercise the
lien rendered defendant's action a state action. 124 The Court rejected this
theory because defendant had several remedial options other than using
the lien statute. Thus, the government had not coerced defendant's ac-
tion. ' 5 Justice Stevens's dissent argued that the majority's dividing line
for statutory potency, drawn at "permits but does not compel," was arti-
ficial and could encourage governments to duck liability for such in-
fringements by delegating their authority.' 26 He worried that deserving
plaintiffs deprived of their property without notice, would also be de-
prived of a federal remedy,127 and that the majority was turning its back
on the reasoned fairness underlying decisions such as Fuentes v.
Shevin, 21 which provided government oversight of replevin activity to
protect otherwise defenseless plaintiffs. 29
The "joint participation" theory of the 1961 case Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority3 ' marked the apex of the Supreme Court's
stretching of state action. Since then, Jackson,' Blum, 132 and
Tarkanian33 have signaled an unequivocal retrenchment.134 The de-
fendant in Burton, a private restaurant concession in a government park-
120. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 245-48.
121. Id at 246-48.
122. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
123. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 151-53.
124. Id at 153, 157.
125. Id. at 160.
126. Id at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id at 178-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
129. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See Strickland, supra note 110, at 623-26.
131. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
132. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991.
133. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
134. Strickland, supra note 110, at 656-59, sees emerging support from Justice O'Connor's
middle wing of the Supreme Court for the symbiosis theory of Burton. Strickland's prediction
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ing facility, discriminated on the basis of race. 135 The concession was
leased from the government, was on government land, and thus enjoyed
tax-exempt status. 136 It was patronized mostly by government employ-
ees. 137 The government entity paid for its heat, gas, and repairs. 138 The
record showed that the government had had difficulty financing the park-
ing and retail facility, which was vital to alleviation of downtown traffic
congestion, and the facility's continued existence was heavily dependent
on rents from retailers such as defendant. 39 The Court characterized
the restaurant's discrimination as a state action because the cumulative
effect of all these ties created a sufficiently symbiotic relationship."4
The Rehnquist Court has retreated from earlier extensions of state
action theories such as Burton.1 41 Blum v. Yaretsk 1 42 exemplifies this
shift away from enforcing federal constitutional protections against os-
tensibly private actors. In Blum, plaintiff Medicaid recipients brought a
class action against government-regulated nursing care facilities, for
transfers without notice or patient input, from high-care to lower-care
facilities. 143 Government financial support of the private facilities was
contingent on government-dictated assessments of patients' health; if pa-
tients deserving less care were kept on at the higher-care facilities, the
money would be withdrawn." 4 The state provided clear economic disin-
centives for contrary assignments.145 The complained-of transfers would
not have been ordered but for government regulations. 1416 Despite these
seemingly coercive state influences, the Court found no state action be-
cause the transfers were ordered pursuant to the medical opinions of pri-
vate doctors.1 47 Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the doctors in
fact scored patients on a state-prescribed scale with precise measure-
ments requiring minimal discretion 148; that the state closely scrutinized
is well presented, but neither Tarkanian nor the appointment of Justices Souter and Thomas
strengthens it.
135. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716 (1961).
136. Id. at 718-20.
137. Id. at 724.
138. Id. at 720.
139. Id. at 715-17, 723-24.
140. Id. at 724-26. See Strickland, supra note 110, at 623; Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra
note 104, at 408.
141. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Justice Brennan stated in his Blum dissent that "[t]he degree of
interdependence between the State and the nursing home is far more pronounced than it was
between the State and the private entity in [Burton]." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1028
(1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
143. Id. at 993-94. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 1009-10.
145. Id. at 1009-11.
146. Id. at 1008.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1020-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
the process of review and assignment, for cost-containment reasons1 49;
and that the state administrative body "ha[d] the final say" on transfer
decisions.1 50 Brennan's dissent was persuasive here: With ninety percent
of the facilities' patients on Medicaid,"' it is difficult to accept that the
supposedly independent doctors felt no pressure and ignored the source
of their paychecks. The joint participation and "degree of interdepen-
dence" was greater in Blum than in Burton."2
Tarkanian offered an analogous interrelationship between the pri-
vate National College Athletic Association (NCAA) and a state univer-
sity, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV), whose star coach
was charged with recruitment violations.1 3 The majority declined to en-
force plaintiff coach's federal due process rights, because the NCAA's
disciplinary recommendation was not a state action.1 54 The Court felt
that the state university had not delegated its power over its employee to
the private NCAA; that the NCAA had no direct authority over Coach
Tarkanian; and that UNLV's interest in keeping its popular coach was in
fact adverse to the NCAA's aim of suspending him.1
55
The Tarkanian Court passed up a chance to resurrect the Burton
theory. The NCAA is the primary collegiate league; although UNLY
technically had a choice to quit the league and keep Coach Tarkanian,
the choice was not unfettered. Leaving the NCAA would radically alter
the school's athletic program and no doubt would significantly reduce
alumni contributions. As far as adversity between UNLV and the
NCAA, it is more plausible that UNLV realized that plaintiff coach's
highly publicized recruitment violations meant that he had to go, but the
university was relieved to have the NCAA do its dirtywork, thereby miti-
gating any alumni outcry. The Tarkanian dissent stresses the quasi-con-
tractual relationship between the NCAA and UNLV: UNLV adopted
NCAA rules and investigative procedures, abided by NCAA findings,
and implemented-willingly or not-the NCAA's suspension recom-
mendation. 5 6 Again, the "cumulative effect" could have been character-
ized as joint action.
An alternative to the "symbiosis" theory is the "government func-
tion" theory of state action. The government function theory does not
involve actual government action, but rather an exclusively governmen-
tal activity performed by a private actor.15 7 For example, in Marsh v.
149. Id. at 1014-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1022-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id at l011, i d at 1027 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 1027-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181-83 (1988).
154. Id. at 199.
155. Id at 194-98.
156. Id at 199-203 (White, J., dissenting).
157. See Strickland, supra note 110, at 627-33.
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Alabama a company town restricted free speech rights potentially en-
forceable through the Fourteenth Amendment."5 8 Since the private com-
pany itself was responsible for all municipal functions such as roads,
sewer systems, and police, the Court found the company restrictions to
be state actions.1 59 Running an election was another private action that
qualified as a state action because of its uniquely governmental
character. 160
The Supreme Court has more recently been reluctant to use the gov-
ernment function theory. The Court declined to apply this theory to a
private shopping center in Lloyd v. Tanner1 61 or to a private electrical
utility in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.1 62 The Jackson majority felt
that the government had not really granted defendant utility a monopoly,
but that defendant enjoyed a "natural monopoly." Thus, no vicarious
government action was evident. 163 Justice Marshall's dissent asserted
that although electricity production is a natural monopoly where compe-
tition would greatly complicate service, competition might still arise if
permitted by the state; though initial entry costs are high, providing elec-
tricity has a sufficiently guaranteed, "inelastic market... to attract com-
petitive investment." '  More generally, Marshall contended that
providing electricity is quintessentially and "traditionally identified with
the State through universal public regulation or ownership .... 1165
Electricity is like roads or sewers: a public entitlement in a modern, ur-
ban society.
The more liberal wing of the Court has taken an expansive view of
the government function, arguing that exercising liens and providing
electrical service are normally, though not always, government activi-
ties. 1 66 A policy that government should in fairness afford a constitu-
tional remedy for fundamental deprivations underlies this position.
Marshall stated in Jackson that sacrifices should be expected from an
otherwise private company that acts in a governmental capacity. 67 This
vision of increased private responsibility runs counter to the laissez-faire
158. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-05, 509 (1946).
159. Id. at 505-08.
160. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
161. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
162. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
163. Id. at 351-53.
164. Id. at 367 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The success of U.S. Sprint and MCI in long-
distance telephone markets would seem to bear Marshall out.
165. Id at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
167-68, 171-74 (1978) (Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting separately); Strickland, supra
note 110, at 649-53.
167. "[I]f private companies wish to enter the field, they will have to surrender many of the
prerogatives normally associated with private enterprise and behave in many ways like a gov-
emmental body." Jackson, 419 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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individualism articulated in Harlan's Peterson concurrence that the fed-
eral constitution should not interfere with private activity.16
In sum, the Supreme Court has addressed federal constitutional pro-
tections of workplace privacy primarily under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court's current balancing analysis allows searches without probable
cause, warrants, and/or individualized suspicion. A more potent right to
personal autonomy stems directly from the Due Process Clause, but the
Court has applied this protection sparingly to a narrow band of hetero-
sexual marital and procreation rights. Invasion of private employees'
privacy thus largely lacks a federal constitutional remedy.
The state action requirement also limits application of the Four-
teenth Amendment to private employers. For either a due process or a
Fourth Amendment violation to be actionable, the employer's conduct
must be statutorily compelled, or more interwoven with a state entity
than the care facilities were in Blum, or as inherently governmental as
the company town in Marsh. If special needs exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment do not derail a federal constitutional privacy action against
a private employer, the state action requirement will.
I. California State Constitutional Privacy Protections
A. An Explicit Constitutional Privacy Right and Its Advantages
L An Explicit and Self-Executing Right
California is one of ten states with an explicit privacy right in its
state constitutions.169 Some states have recognized implied constitu-
tional privacy rights170 analogous to the federal penumbral right first in-
168. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra
text accompanying note 108.
The concept also conflicts with the Bad Samaritan Rule deeply rooted in the Anglo-
American legal system. Under the Bad Samaritan Rule, one's only legal obligation to stran-
gers is to avoid harming them; one has no affirmative duty to them unless one is in some legally
recognized special relationship to them. Thus, the men who walked by the injured person in
the biblical parable, before the Good Samaritan happened by, would not be legally liable. This
is, of course, only a general principle to which many exceptions and qualifications exist.
169. See Ezzard, supra note 32, at 403; Silverstein, supra note 32, at 216. The ten states
are: Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (1972)); Arizona (ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 8 (1910));
California (CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1972, 1974)); Florida (FLA. CONsT. art. I, §§ 12, 23
(1981)); Hawaii (HAw. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7 (1968, 1978)); Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6,
12 (1970)); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1974)); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10
(1972)); South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1971)); Washington (WASH. CONsr. art. I,
§ 7 (1889)).
This Note will review only California's constitutional privacy right in order to remain a
manageable length, and because California's explicit right offers most of what an explicit fed-
eral right, which the Note will propose, could offer.
170. See Nan Feyler, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 973, 981 n.75 (1986).
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yoked in Griswold.171
California's explicit privacy right is "inalienable." 172 Article I, Sec-
tion 1 states in part: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are ... pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy."1 73 Black's Law Dictionary defines ina-
lienable rights as "[r]ights which are not capable of being surrendered or
transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights." 74
Unlike the federal penumbral privacy right, California's explicit pri-
vacy guarantee is "self-executing."'' 75 To state a federal question and
thereby gain federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff needs a statu-
tory vehicle on which to premise the action. A state or federal statute
itself can be the state action needed for a federal claim.176 California
privacy rights need no such statutory vehicle. 177 Even if California's pri-
vacy right were not explicit, state governmental powers, unlike federal
powers, are not restricted to those that are constitutionally
enumerated.178
2. Advantages to Protection at a Constitutional Level
Several advantages accrue from protecting privacy at a constitu-
tional level. Only the most fundamental rights are protected constitu-
tionally. A broad, inclusive constitutional provision can change more
flexibly with social mores than a narrow, well-defined statutory provi-
sion. The constitutional provision will preempt a statutory one. Finally,
constitutions are more difficult to change than statutes or common law
precedent.
When a voter initiative added California's explicit privacy right to
its constitution in 1972, the language in the ballot arguments for its pas-
sage unequivocally endorsed a broad and fundamental right:
171. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See supra part II.A. For example,
New Jersey identified a "right of personality" in its state constitution, N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1,
that embraced Karen Ann Quinlan's right not to exist indefinitely in a mindless "vegetative"
state, and permitted her father to disconnect her life-support system. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
172. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (Ct. App. 1990). For
implications to state constitutional independence, see infra note 204 and accompanying text;
for implications to absence of state action requirement, see infra note 277 and accompanying
text.
173. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 759 (6th ed. 1990).
175. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975); Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr.
545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct.
App. 1976).
176. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring).
177. People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 746 (Cal. 1979).
178. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 815 (Wash. 1986).
The elevation of the right to be free from invasions of privacy to
constitutional stature was apparently intended to be an expansion
of the privacy right. The election brochure argument states: "The
right to privacy is much more than 'unnecessary wordage.' It isfundamental to any free society.... This simple amendment will
extend various court decisions on privacy to insure protection of
our basic rights." '179
A constitutional provision generally trumps a contrary statutory or
common law provision.180 The California privacy right supersedes a
contrary statute. 81 California courts have labelled the constitutional pri-
vacy right fundamental and more far-reaching than common law privacy
rights. 182
Constitutional rights can be broader than statutory rights, and more
malleable and elastic for future social developments. This is crucial for
privacy rights, which are intimately connected to technological develop-
ments, population increases and density, urbanization, and concentration
and centralization of information. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Burton,
alluded to the intentional "imprecision" of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which "was necessary if the right were to be enjoyed in the variety of
individual-state relationships which the Amendment was designed to
embrace." 183
One could argue that if a right such as privacy is truly fundamental,
it would not change over time. In fact, only privacy's manifestations and
its social contexts develop historically, while the right itself remains
constant.
Constitutional provisions are more difficult to eliminate, once en-
acted. Voters can amend the California Constitution by initiative, but
the legislature cannot amend it statutorily. 84 Initiative measures are
179. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841-42 (emphasis added). See also Soroka v. Dayton
Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 82 (Ct. App. 1991).
When California courts need to examine the Framers' intentions about a constitutional
provision, the courts infer these intentions from ballot arguments. See infra note 284 and
accompanying text.
On the fundamentality of privacy, see generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rtv. 193 (1890); BRILL, supra note 49, at xii ("We believe it
an inherent, perhaps an inviolable, right to define for ourselves what can be known or revealed,
and to whom, and to choose what we want to hide, or to veil, from public scrutiny."); but see
generally HIxsON, supra note I (Privacy is not a natural right but one bestowed by the state.
Over-pursuit of privacy is selfish and anti-communitarian.).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77
(1803).
181. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550 (Ct. App. 1986).
182. E.g., id. at 549.
183. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
184. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990).
Amendment of the federal constitution requires ratification by the legislatures of three
quarters of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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constitutionally limited by the single-subject rule, i"5 which mandates
that initiatives have some "common concern" or "discernible common
thread" to which all their detailed proposals are "reasonably
germane." 18 6
Revising rather than merely amending the state constitution re-
quires either a constitutional convention plus subsequent voter ratifica-
tion, or "legislative submission of the measure to the voters."187 To
ascertain whether proposed constitutional changes are revisions or
amendments, the changes are assessed quantitatively and qualitatively.188
Article I, Section 24 of the California Constitution states in part, "Rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed
by the United States Constitution." '189 Proposition 115 would have con-
formed criminal rights to federal constitutional levels. 1' 9 The state
supreme court unanimously blocked 115's proposed conformity change
to Article I, Section 24,191 because it was qualitatively "devastating" in
reducing all criminal rights protections to federal levels, and thereby
usurping state court independence. 192  That a conservative supreme
court, historically unsympathetic to criminal rights, rejected this con-
formity revision, attests to the flexibility of the state constitutional
amendment process.
185. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d); Raven, 801 P.2d at 1083.
186. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1083; Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 279 (Cal. 1982);
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290
(Cal. 1978). The California Supreme Court upheld both of the so-called Victims' Bill of Rights
initiatives-Proposition 8 in Brosnahan and Proposition 115 in Raven (as discussed later, one
provision of 115 was held unconstitutional, but the rest was upheld)-using a loose version of
this "reasonably germane" test to find that all the specific provisions could be grouped under a
common label such as criminal rights, and thus the propositions passed the single-subject rule.
Justice Mosk dissented persuasively in Raven that Proposition 115 is exactly the sort of "grab-
bag" the single-subject rule was aimed at preventing, because of voter confusion and the "log-
rolling" effect, where clauses that would not have passed independently are tacked on as riders
to a winning initiative. Mosk disparaged the majority's common label analysis, pointing out
that if a label is broad enough, anything can fit under it; he believed the "reasonably germane"
inquiry should consider interrelationships among the provisions, which in Proposition 115 cov-
ered topics as disparate as joinder, torture, and voir dire.
187. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2; Raven, 801 P.2d at 1085.
188. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086.
189. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24; Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086.
190. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086. Florida passed a similar conformity amendment in 1982,
which linked the state's privacy protections, especially against unconstitutional search and
seizure, to "the Fourth Amendment... as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court."
The exclusionary rule was likewise conformed to the federal standard. FLA. CONsT. art. I,
§§ 12 (search and seizure), 23 (right "to be let alone") (1982).
191. Raven, 801 P.2d at 1086-88.
192. Id. The court found the revision to Article I, Section 24 quantitatively minor, since it
affected only one section of the constitution. But it believed the qualitative effect was enor-
mous, because state courts would be relieved of all power to protect any criminal right-
including due process, equal protection, and counsel rights-beyond the federal minimum
standard. Principles of federalism would clearly be threatened.
B. State Constitutional Independence and Issues of Federalism
Just as Raven guaranteed state independence in providing constitu-
tional protections beyond those federally mandated in the area of crimi-
nal rights, state constitutions guard privacy rights beyond federal
protection levels. State constitutions traditionally have provided a sec-
ond line of defense for civil liberties,1 93 and with recent erosions in fed-
eral protections,194 will serve as the new front line. 195  Many state
protections surpass federal minimal protections of individual rights.1 96
For example, City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson 197 did not share the U.S.
Supreme Court's reluctance in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas1 98 to pro-
tect unrelated cohabitants against a hostile city zoning ordinance. The
California Supreme Court held that a zoning ordinance violated the state
privacy rights of a group of unrelated persons who chose to share a
household, absent a showing of a compelling state interest against com-
munal living arrangements. ' 99 The U.S. Supreme Court did protect a
grandmother's right to live with her grandson in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,2 °" by a 5-4 majority, but was unwilling to extend federal pri-
vacy protection any further.20 1
In two narrow areas, California has adopted federal constitutional
standards as its own. California's exclusionary rule, as applied in a crim-
193. See Feyler, supra note 170, at 974, 985; Brennan, supra note 7, at 547-52.
194. See supra part II.B.
195. "Now, the diminution of federal scrutiny and protection out of purported deference to
the states mandates the assumption of a more responsible state court role. And state courts
have taken seriously their obligation as coequal guardians of civil rights and liberties." Bren-
nan, supra note 7, at 548. State constitutional expansions of fundamental rights are especially
significant during an era of retrenchment by the federal government on civil liberties. Id. at
547-52. Justice Brennan calls ultimately for dual, overlapping protection of fundamental due
process and equal protection rights by federal and state constitutions, but realizes that current
judicial and political trends will leave the states to fill the gap. Id
196. See Decker, supra note 1, at 566-67.
197. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).
198. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
199. The state court found that the city zoning ordinance, whose "rule of five" proscribed
cohabitation of more than five unrelated persons, violated California's right to privacy in Arti-
cle I, Section 1. Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d at 439-42. The court reviewed various
city interests, including prevention of overcrowding, and maintenance of "a suitable environ-
ment for family life." Because the ordinance "does not limit the number of related residents,
or of servants, [i]t does not appear to have been designed to prevent overcrowding .. " If the
"suitable environment" envisioned was one with less traffic and noise, the "rule of five" was
not necessarily an effective way to achieve such an environment; related persons may be noisy
or have many cars. Finally, if the "suitable environment" phrase was a code word indicating
moral condemnation of communal living, "[tihat implied goal would not be legitimate." Id at
441.
200. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
201. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. 1.
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inal search and seizure context, only extends to the federal minimum.2 "2
Additionally, California uses the federal constitutional standard for cruel
and unusual punishment in capital cases.20 3 While some state constitu-
tional privacy guarantees are limited to search and seizure contexts,
others like California's stand alone. 2" Because the California Constitu-
tion has an "inalienable" privacy right separate from its search and
seizure protection,20 5 Proposition 8's forced linkage of the state's exclu-
sionary rule to federal standards206 does not affect the broader privacy
right.
In general, California constitutional interpretation is not dependent
on federal constitutional guidelines:
"It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitu-
tions textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mir-
ror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise
.... [SItate charters... [provide] the only line of protection of the
individual against the excesses of local officials." Accordingly,...
state courts, in interpreting constitutional guarantees contained in
state constitutions, are "independently responsible for safeguarding
the rights of their citizens." '
California's constitutional privacy right is broader than the federal
right,20 8 and courts determine it independently. 2°9 Indeed, California's
right was adopted expressly to fill a perceived gap in federal coverage.210
Federal guarantees provide a floor below which states may not ven-
ture,211 and California courts owe some degree of deference to federal
interpretations, especially of criminal rights.21 2 Above that floor, Cali-
202. People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 392 (Cal. 1983); See Silverstein, supra note 32, at
245-46.
203. People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 612-14 (Cal. 1979).
204. Regarding search and seizure only: see Silverstein, supra note 32, at 227-28; Ezzard,
supra note 32, at 413-18. Regarding stand-alone privacy rights: see Silverstein, supra note 32,
at 227-32; Feyler, supra note 170, at 980.
205. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1974) (stand-alone privacy right); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13
(1974) (search and seizure protection).
206. See In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1985). For discussion of Proposition 8, see
infra note 341 and accompanying text.
207. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783 (Cal. 1981) (quot-
ing People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)).
208. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 49 (Ct. App.
1989) (citing Myers, 625 P.2d at 785); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440
n.3 (Cal. 1980)).
209. American Academy, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (citing Allen v. Superior Court, 557 P.2d 65,
67 (Cal. 1976)).
210. Id. at 51 (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975)).
211. Id. at 49. The Supremacy Clause provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Law of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
212. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1086-89 (Cal. 1990).
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fornia courts are free either to follow federal levels of protection, or to
define their own levels. 213 To preserve a holding on independent state
grounds and be immune from Supreme Court invalidation using federal
grounds, a state court must clearly and expressly indicate the state-law
basis of its decision. 214
Expansion of state privacy rights above the federal floor preserves
local history and culture,215 and permits local "experimentation" with
diverse protections. 216 Local social values about privacy may be radi-
cally different from the prevailing national consensus.217 State constitu-
tions and courts may be more democratic and "more immediately
'subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts.'" Unlike federal
judges, state judges do not have life terms, but must face elections. 218 In
addition, California grants strong deference to voters' wishes expressed
in initiatives and referenda,21 9 which were the source of the privacy
amendment.
A Washington State case, State v. Gunwall,220 set out six "non-ex-
clusive neutral criteria" to assist in a state court's choice between state or
federal constitutional grounds: "(1) the textual language [of both consti-
tutions]; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preex-
isting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular
state or local concern." '221 Washington and California have explicit con-
stitutional privacy protections with broader applicability than that of the
federal Fourth Amendment, as discussed above. These states have con-
213. American Academy, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 49-51. American Academy offers People v. Ter-
esinski, 640 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1982), as an example of the California Supreme Court's adoption of
federal Fourth Amendment protection levels. American Academy, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
American Academy itself is an example of state court independence: This case extended state
privacy rights involving abortion decisions equally to minors and adults, contrary to Supreme
Court decisions such as Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). See also PruneYard v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Brennan, supra note 7, at 548.
214. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Brennan, supra note 7, at 552 (citing Long);
Ezzard, supra note 32, at 410. See Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent "Ade-
quate and Independent State Grounds" Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371 (1991).
Schnurer suggests a return to the pre-Long presumption that state court decisions rest on
independent state grounds even where that reliance is not clearly stated. Schnurer also points
out how easily state courts can circumvent the Long requirement, thus undercutting its utility.
215. See Silverstein, supra note 32, at 285-96, for a detailed discussion of Illinois's develop-
ment of its state privacy right.
216. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 549-50.
217. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (possession of small amounts of
marijuana for personal use is protected by state constitutional right to privacy).
218. Brennan, supra note 7, at 551 (quoting Gregory S. Bruch, Note, Michigan v. Long:
Presumptive Federal Appellate Jurisdiction over State Cases Containing Ambiguous Grounds of
Decision, 69 IowA L. REv. 1081, 1096-97 (1984)).
219. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978).
220. 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).
221. Id. at 811.
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stitutional and common law histories that emphasize privacy safeguards,
as the legislative and ballot records surrounding the passage of their state
privacy provisions indicate.222 The Gunwall court also contrasted the
limited structure of the federal constitution, which grants only enumer-
ated powers, with the plenary power of state constitutions, whose "ex-
plicit affirmation of fundamental rights... may be seen as a guarantee of
those rights rather than as a restriction on them. ' 22 3 In excluding evi-
dence obtained from a telephone pen register, which federal precedent
would have allowed,224 the Washington Supreme Court traced a state
history of preserving telephone privacy, based on statutory and case
law.225
California, like Washington, has found state constitutional protec-
tion where the U.S. Supreme Court found no federal constitutional pro-
tection. The reasoning in California's Myers decision2 26 was opposite to
the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of a constitutional right to abortion
funding.227 Consistent with Gunwall's analysis of the federal constitu-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court found no affirmative right to government
funding for an abortion even if that effectively would prohibit a poor
woman from obtaining an abortion.228 In contrast, California found an
affirmative, state constitutional right for abortion funding.229
In another right-to-funding case, Robbins v. Superior Court,230 the
California Supreme Court found that a welfare program mandating shel-
ter residency in lieu of direct welfare payments violated the state privacy
right. The dormitory shelters had common bathrooms and no partitions
around sleeping areas, residents were under curfew and subject to a 9:00
P.M. bedcheck, their visiting rights and phone access were restricted,
and the dorms were not always physically safe. The state court believed
that the overall loss of control of residents' lives, loss of dignity, and the
"social stigma" violated fundamental privacy rights. In addition, the
program did not achieve the state's goals of increased self-reliance and
self-respect. 231 Although there is no federal case on point, extrapolation
222. Id. at 812. See also infra note 284 and accompanying text.
223. Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
224. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
225. Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 814-17.
226. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 780-81 (Cal. 1981).
227. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
228. Under the federal constitution, a woman has a right to choose an abortion but no right
to the abortion's funding. Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297; Maher, 432
U.S. 464.
229. Myers, 625 P.2d at 781 (statute restricting Medi-Cal funding for abortions held uncon-
stitutional, because "the asserted state interest in protecting fetal life cannot constitutionally
claim priority over the woman's fundamental right of procreative choice.").
230. Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695 (Cal. 1985).
231. Id. at 697-706.
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from the abortion funding cases and from the substantive traditionalism
in federal privacy cases, suggests that a federal analysis would have fol-
lowed more closely Justice Lucas's dissent in Robbins. Lucas took a util-
itarian approach, stressing statistics that welfare recipients stayed in the
shelters for an average of one month, whereas recipients getting cash wel-
fare benefits received them for an average of nine months. He argued
that saving money by encouraging people to get off welfare was a legiti-
mate state interest that was effectively realized through the shelter pro-
gram.232 He disagreed with the majority about residents' loss of control
over their lives, and pointed out that the program provided a clean bed, a
good balanced diet, free bus passes, and stability that would put recipi-
ents back on their feet.233 Each side started with the same facts, but one
approach emphasized personal dignity, and the other emphasized the
government's financial interests. Thus their end positions differ
dramatically.
C. California Standards of Review
1. The Default Test Is Bagley Strict Scrutiny
California requires a compelling governmental interest to justify in-
fringement of a fundamental right such as the constitutional right to pri-
vacy.234 California courts use the three-pronged analysis from Bagley v.
Washington Township Hospital District 35 to test for a compelling interest
that can override a fundamental right, and for narrow tailoring of the
statute or action toward achieving that interest.2 36 The initial prong is
like a rational relationship test, which requires that the action or imposed
conditions reasonably relate to the government's purpose.23 7 This initial
232. Id at 711 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
233. Id at 709-12 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
234. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 666, 669
(Cal. 1986); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224-25, 233-34 (Cal. 1975); Soroka v. Dayton Hud-
son Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 82-86 (Ct. App. 1991); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (Ct. App. 1988), review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990);
Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986).
235. 421 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1966).
236. Long Beach, 719 P.2d at 674 (Bird, C.J., concurring); Robbins v. Superior Court, 695
P.2d 695, 704 (Cal. 1985); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 781
(Cal. 1981). For a discussion of the basic scrutiny levels, see supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
237. Part IV.A addresses non-government actors. The Bagley test has been applied to gov-
ernment invasions of privacy. See Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660; Robbins, 695 P.2d 695; Myers,
625 P.2d 779. Courts have also used it with privacy invasions by non-government actors.
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975) (balancing compelling
interests of a private bank and an invaded customer, without explicitly using the Bagley analy-
sis); Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 408-11 (Ct. App. 1988),
review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990) (using Bagley test for alleged invasion by private
NCAA).
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hurdle is not difficult.238
The next two prongs are analogous to a strict scrutiny standard.
The second prong requires that the benefit from the invasion must "man-
ifestly outweigh any resulting impairment of constitutional rights." 239
This state standard is higher than federal Fourth Amendment balancing
that weighs the privacy invasion against the legitimate government inter-
est. 24' Bagley strict scrutiny does not eliminate all balancing, how-
ever.2 41 In Cutter v. Brownbridge, defendant psychotherapist revealed
damaging private information about plaintiff patient at a proceeding con-
cerning plaintiff's visitation rights with his children, for which revelation
plaintiff sued.242 The psychotherapist claimed statutory immunity,243
and the court held the need to get at the truth in a judicial proceeding is a
compelling enough interest to invade plaintiff's privacy. 2" Once estab-
lished, this compelling interest was balanced against plaintiff's privacy
interest. Based on California's psychotherapist-patient privilege and the
rule that a psychotherapist must claim this privilege for the patient,245
the Cutter court judged that the legislature intended a psychiatric pa-
tient's privacy interest to be very potent, and held that privacy won this
balance.2 46
The third Bagley prong considers less offensive alternatives, and re-
quires that defendant "demonstrate that the ... intrusion on the cher-
ished right of privacy is drawn with narrow specificity."' 4 In Valley
Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, for example, a bank customer's private
records were disclosed in judicial proceedings, because a fraud defense
238. See, e.g., Long Beach, 719 P.2d at 674 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (arguing that polygraph
reasonably related to better public job performance). But see Myers, 625 P.2d at 790-91 (dem-
onstrating that first Bagley prong proved fatal for a statute that intended to provide greater
abortion access to indigents, but accomplished the opposite).
239. Robbins, 695 P.2d at 704; Myers, 625 P.2d at 78 1. See Long Beach, 719 P.2d at 674-75
(Bird, C.J., concurring) (stating that constitutional privacy so damaged by polygraph that hard
to imagine any outweighing benefit, and polygraph evidence not admissible in court, so fails
second Bagley prong).
240. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629-31 (Ct. App. 1990). See
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). The Fourth Amendment
provides a minimum beyond which the California Constitution protects. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr.
at 632.
241. "Fundamental though this constitutional right may be, it is not absolute ..... Cutter
v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986). The Bagky phrase "manifestly
outweighs" denotes balancing.
242. Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545.
243. The California Civil Code grants immunity for otherwise actionable statements made
during a judicial proceeding. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 47(2) (West 1982 & Supp 1992); Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990).
244. Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 551-53.
245. CAL. R. EVID. 1014 and 1015.
246. Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 551-53.
247. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 670 (Cal.
1986).
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depended in part on plaintiffs' names on the records. 248 The court ac-
knowledged that the disclosure itself was necessary and overrode the pri-
vacy interests, but it dictated procedural safeguards to limit such a
disclosure: give plaintiffs notice prior to disclosure; allow them a chance
to oppose it; remove their names from the records if practicable (it was
not in Valley Bank because of the defense); seal all information until spe-
cifically needed; and hold in camera hearings where possible.249
2. Wilkinson's Mid-Level Balancing Test and Employee Drug Testing
White v. Davis and its progeny mandate a compelling interest test-
Bagley strict scrutiny-when the state constitutional privacy right has
been invaded.250 In Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp. ,251 a state appeals
court upheld the constitutionality of drug testing of job applicants under
California constitutional privacy provisions. Wilkinson acknowledged
the requirement of strict scrutiny, but claimed that the factually unusual,
legally narrow holdings in People v. Privitera and Schmidt v. Superior
Court abrogated the requirement.25 2 The appeals court's conclusion
seems far-fetched. California precedent consistently has endorsed strict
scrutiny for privacy intrusions.25 3
Privitera and Schmidt were factually unusual and inappropriate pre-
cedent for the Wilkinson drug testing challenge. In Privitera, the state
high court declined to guard the right to use the drug laetrille under
constitutional privacy grounds.2 4 Laetrille's efficacy was questionable at
the time, so essentially the right to a placebo was at issue. Schmidt25 5 is
equally distinguishable from mainstream privacy rights cases. Although
the Schmidt court utilized a balancing approach in its equal protection
analysis of an age-discrimination case, the court recognized a statutory
exception 256 to the general prohibition against age discrimination for
mobilehome parks only. Park owners could discriminate, because the
close quarters, the retirement-age demographics, and the limited scope of
the discrimination-not city-wide or even neighborhood-wide-were not
248. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).
249. Id. at 980.
250. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224-25 (Cal. 1975). See also Committee to Defend
Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) (employing Bagley three-pronged strict
scrutiny for invasions of California constitutional privacy right); Porten v. University of San
Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843-44 (Ct. App. 1976) (noting that private defendant U.S.F.
will need, at trial, "some compelling public interest justifying" its invasion).
251. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989), review denied,
1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990).
252. Id. at 202-03.
253. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 666-69 (Cal.
1986); Myers, 625 P.2d at 793; White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 224, 233-34.
254. People v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979).
255. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932, 944 (Cal. 1989).
256. Id. at 937-39.
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very onerous. 2 57  Schmidt is a sensible, narrow ruling limited to
mobilehome parks. It should not eliminate a strict standard of review for
violations of privacy by restrictions on household makeup. In fact,
Adamson255 and Atkisson,259 which use compelling interest tests, are the
more general California decisions about violations of privacy in the
household makeup area.
Nevertheless, Wilkinson developed a mid-level balancing test con-
trary to California precedent. 2" The court stated that if the privacy
"right is not substantially burdened or affected, justification by a compel-
ling interest is not required. Instead, the operative question is whether
the challenged conduct is reasonable. ' 26 1 Plaintiff job applicants in Wil-
kinson challenged a drug test required as a condition of employment, for
the non-safety-related positions of copy editor and legal writer, at
lawbook publisher Matthew Bender.262 The court found the testing rea-
sonable because plaintiffs had advance notice of the requirement, and if
they did not want to be tested, "applicants for jobs at Matthew Bender
ha[d] a choice": They could take the test or not take the job.2 16  Also,
several procedural safeguards minimized the intrusion: No one directly
watched applicants while urinating; an independent medical clinic ad-
ministered the tests; the clinic allegedly told Matthew Bender only the
applicant's score, and Matthew Bender did not necessarily attribute a
failing score of 5 to a positive drug result; applicants could challenge the
result and could reapply in six months; according to the employer, fe-
257. Id. at 944-45.
258. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 439-40 (Cal. 1980). Under the
challenged city zoning ordinance, no more than five persons unrelated by blood, marriage, or
adoption could live together in residential areas. The court held that the ordinance's "rule of
five" violated the state constitutional privacy protection. Because more than five related per-
sons could live together, the ordinance was not "designed to prevent overcrowding, which may
be a legitimate zoning goal." Id. at 441.
259. Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380-82 (Ct. App. 1976).
A Housing Code provision prohibited a defendant's cohabitation with a person of the opposite
gender not related by blood, marriage, or adoption as immoral and irresponsible. The court
invalidated this provision on the ground, inter alia, that it violated the federal constitutional
privacy right. Id. See supra part II.A, on the federal right under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
260. See Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 666-69
(Cal. 1986); White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224, 233-34 (Cal. 1975); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson
Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 83-86 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The major underpinning of Wilkinson is
suspect," because the California constitutional privacy provision affords just as much protec-
tion to job applicants as it does to current employees, and because the Wilkinson court should
have used Bagley strict scrutiny when considering testing of applicants and employees alike.).
261. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 203 (Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990).
262. Id. at 196.
263. Id. at 204.
male applicants were not tested for pregnancy,2"' which presumably
would be unconstitutional; and applicants' medical histories remained
confidential.26
Arguments against the reasonableness of drug testing focus on what
is being tested: job performance, or personal lifestyle and attitude. An
employer should be allowed to test for job impairment, for drug use that
affects an employee's performance. But weekend marijuana use, for ex-
ample, which probably does not affect performance, may generate a posi-
tive test for weeks or even months later. An employee's drug use should
impact the employer-have some "nexus to the job"-before the em-
ployer disciplines, discharges, or does not hire the employee.2 6 6 The U.S.
Supreme Court opined that any evidence of drug use, while not conclu-
sive, could indicate possible on-the-job use.267 In general, effective man-
agement addresses behavior, not attitude.2 68  Behavior can be
documented and reformed; an employer can discipline or eventually fire
an employee for stealing, tardiness, unacceptably low productivity, or de-
stroying department morale, without making any presumptions about his
or her personal life. Drug use will usually affect performance; in the rare
instance it does not and there is no attendant poor performance, the em-
ployer loses nothing. Employers often subscribe to independent em-
ployee assistance programs (EAPs),2 69 which offer help ranging from
financial advice to substance abuse counselling. If management refers an
egregious or obvious problem to an EAP, management will not be di-
rectly involved in an employee's personal life. Dignity is an ephemeral
and elusive concept, but California courts have not been afraid to recog-
264. Cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7 (1989): The
Skinner majority dismissed any danger of the employer learning "private medical facts," be-
cause there was no showing that the employer had done anything improper with such facts.
265. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
266. Although the state right of privacy is broader than the federal right, California
courts construing article I, section 1 have looked to federal precedents for guidance.
Under the lower federal standard, employees may not be compelled to submit to a
violation of their right to privacy unless a clear, direct nexus exists between the na-
ture of the employee's duty and the nature of the violation. We are satisfied that this
nexus requirement applies with even greater force under article I, section 1.
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 85 (Ct. App. 1991) (citations to Luck v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629-31 (1990) omitted). See JAMES R.
REDEKER, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND PRAcrIcEs 15, 247-51 (Bureau of Nat'l
Affairs, Inc., 1989).
267. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631-32; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).
268. See REDEKER, supra note 266, at 192-98. Redeker advises management, "The em-
ployee's poor attitude should have caused, or have been combined with, other unacceptable
conduct."
269. Matthew Bender, the subsidiary of Times Mirror that used the drug test in its hiring
proc6ss, subscribed to such a service during the period of the Wilkinson litigation.
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nize it.
270
Less policy-oriented arguments against drug testing focus on poten-
tial errors with serious consequences and on testing's overbroad scope.
False positives may have drastic consequences such as losing a job.271
Sophisticated athletes and other test takers have developed techniques to
generate false negatives, such as flushing out traces with diuretics.272
Urine or blood samples can reveal many aspects of an employee's
life and health: pregnancy, epilepsy, diabetes, high blood pressure, pres-
ence of the HIV antibody, and use of prescription medication such as
lithium for depression.273 Employees or applicants have no concrete
guarantees that employers are not surreptitiously authorizing prohibited
tests, such as for pregnancy, which could benefit an employer greatly.274
One resolution of this dilemma would be to put the burden on employers
to demonstrate that they are not conducting such tests. 275 All these ob-
jections reinforce testing's invasiveness and militate for the strictest
scrutiny.
270. See, e.g., Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695, 699-700 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)
(citing shelter residents' lack of dignity and control over their own lives, and "social stigma" as
factors in upholding their privacy action to avoid forced residency in lieu of welfare payments).
271. False positives are test results that erroneously show drug use when the test subject
has not in fact been taking drugs. For a discussion on the unreliability of urine drug tests, see
generally Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 414-15, 422 (Ct. App.
1988), review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (1990).
In Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 205 (Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990), the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims of test unreli-
ability, relying on Skinner. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 632 n.10, in turn, does not directly address
the unreliability issue, because "[r]espondents have provided us with no reason for doubting
the Agency's conclusion that the tests at issue here are accurate in the overwhelming majority
of cases." Thus the source of the accuracy assessment is a federal agency litigating its right to
test.
272. False negatives are test results that fail to show drug use when the test subject has
taken drugs.
See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676 (1989) (finding
avoidance tricks ineffective and "fraught with uncertainty"). See Cochran, supra note 104, at
560, on "masking" drug use. Evidently, athletes can enhance performance with substances
naturally occurring in the body, such as the hormone testosterone; because of the resulting
high threshold level before testing positive, they can ingest significant doses without triggering
a positive.
273. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 647 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 417,
listed four privacy interests potentially invaded by drug testing, of which the second was confi-
dentiality of medical information. Female athletes especially had a protectible privacy interest
in not revealing whether they took birth control pills.
274. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 n.7, dismissed this possibility absent any showing of im-
proper use of samples by the employer.
275. See infra note 390 and accompanying text, for proposal to shift this burden of proof to
employers.
IV. The Private Sector
A. No State Action Is Needed for California Privacy
The California constitutional privacy right from Article I, Section 1,
is enforceable against governmental and non-governmental invaders
alike.2 76 "Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is con-
sidered an inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone. 277
State supreme court dicta in Schmidt intimated possible hostility toward
enforcing the constitutional privacy right absent state action,278 but later
in the decision the court drew back, indicating that since it had not
reached the state action issue, it need not decide it.279 Two years after
Schmidt, in Rojo v. Kliger, the California Supreme Court found that vio-
lation of a fundamental, public, constitutional right by a private em-
ployer is actionable as a violation of public policy.280 Rojo alluded
favorably, in dicta, to Luck's and Wilkinson's use of constitutional pri-
vacy rights against private employers.281
Because the California Constitution does not expressly state whether
276. Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Butte Glenn Medical Soc'y, 557 F. Supp.
1190 (E.D. Cal. 1983) (private doctors); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77,
83 (Ct. App. 1991) (private employer); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618,
628 (Ct. App. 1990) (private employer); Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (private athletic associa-
tion); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198-200 (Ct. App. 1989) (private
employer); Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986) (psychotherapist
who revealed confidential information about his patient); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668
(Ct. App. 1986) (the NBC network); Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1980)
(plaintiff's former girlfriend); Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842
(Ct. App. 1976) (private university); Cochran, supra note 104, at 546; see White v. Davis, 533
P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975); Silverstein, supra note 32, at 241.
277. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
278. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 769 P.2d 932, 943-44 (Cal. 1989). The court distinguished
prior state and federal cases with similar factual backgrounds, because those cases involved
direct state action, whereas the complained-of action in Schmidt was by a private mobilehome
park under color of state law.
279. "[W]e have no occasion in this case to consider under what circumstances, if any,
purely private action by a property owner or landlord would constitute a violation of the state
constitutional privacy provision." Schmidt, 769 P.2d at 944 n. 14. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 628,
analyzed the Schmidt dicta and found that it did not override the precedents against a state
action requirement, because: the privacy interest in Schmidt was less personal (the right to live
in a mobilehome park, as opposed to the right to be free from bodily intrusion, for example);
the court expressly declined to decide the issue; the ruling found no constitutional protection,
so even if the court had decided the state action issue, it would have been dicta; and finally, as
in White's analysis, the ballot argument repeatedly characterized the constitutional protection
as being against government and private business. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34
(Cal. 1975).
280. Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1990) (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)). Rojo found sex discrimination by a private employer actionable in
tort if the employer "contravenes the dictates of fundamental public policy."
281. Rojo, 801 P.2d at 388.
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state action is needed, the issue must be resolved by inference. 28 2 The
supreme court's White v. Davis decision and subsequent appeals court
cases dissected the ballot arguments submitted to voters.28 3 The ballot
arguments discussed in these cases testify to the intentions of the framers
of the privacy amendment, which was added by initiative in 1972. First,
White affirmed the process of inferring a provision's intended content
from its ballot arguments.28 4 Then the court identified many references
to "government and business" in the ballot argument for the privacy
amendment. The amendment would fulfill the need for "effective re-
straints on the information activities of government and business." It
would "preven[t] government and business interests from collecting and
stockpiling unnecessary information about us," and would retard "[t]he
proliferation of government and business records over which we have no
control.... Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy
of government and business records of individuals. ' 28 5 Wilkinson ana-
lyzed the same ballot argument language, noted assorted references to
private business activities such as credit card and insurance applications,
and concluded, "The [ballot] argument's repeated references to informa-
tion-gathering activities by both government and business lead inexora-
bly to the conclusion that the amendment was intended to reach both
governmental and nongovernmental conduct." '286 Wilkinson additionally
asserted that an amendment that realistically meant to ensure informa-
tional privacy "would indeed be illusory if only the government's collec-
tion and retention of data were restricted. '28 7
The California constitutional privacy right, then, does not have the
state action requirement that the federal due process privacy right car-
ries. The framers of the state constitutional amendment expressed their
clear intent, inferable from their ballot arguments, that the privacy pro-
tection extend to invasions by private actors. In addition, the explicit
state provision does not have the Fourteenth Amendment's language lim-
iting its applicability to state action.28 8
282. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
283. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 233-34; Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28; Wilkinson v.
Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198 (Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 1989 Cal. App.
LEXIS 1168 (1990).
284. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 234 n.11; In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 753 n.8 (Cal.
1985).
285. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 233-34 (quoting from the ballot argument in favor of the
privacy amendment). Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 198, adds another quotation from the ballot
argument, that "few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review
their files and correct errors."
286. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 198; see also In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 754 ("the intent
of the enacting body is the paramount consideration").
287. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
288. "[NMor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). CAL. CONST. art. I, § I
B. Public Interests and Private Employer Interests
Over centuries of industrialization and concentration of capital,
with the concommitant decline in the artisan class, the employer-em-
ployee relationship has become the foundation of our economy. 289 This
relationship is for many the center of social existence as well, as
suburbanization and secularization seem to have displaced traditional so-
cial matrices such as the town square or the local church or temple. Self-
worth and community reputation depend significantly on one's job. Both
on a personal and a macro-economic level, the employment relationship
underlies health and stability, and is fundamental.
Productivity and efficiency are usually an employer's primary con-
cern about its employees. A worker's private pursuits such as drug use
can affect productivity.2 9° Federal Fourth Amendment analyses such as
that in Von Raab have viewed an employer's interest in good employee
performance as compelling, asserting that the employment context alone
should reduce employee expectations of privacy; however, Von Raab ad-
dressed Customs workers in potentially dangerous jobs, so this point may
be limited.2 91 The state action requirement also restricts the Fourth
Amendment's applicability to private employers, through the Fourteenth
Amendment.292
The Luck decision held that efficiency and worker competency are
not compelling interests that overcome an employee's privacy right
under the state constitution.2 93 The Luck court also maintained that
public safety interests would be compelling, and that determining
whether a job affects public safety is a question of law. 94 Plaintiff Luck
had a desk job at defendant railroad that was unrelated to public
safety. 295 The court believed it was following the underlying reasoning of
states in part: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are ... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
289. See Decker, supra note 1, at 554.
290. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 407; Dean S. Landis, Note, Drug Testing
of Private Employees, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 552, 552 n.3 (1987); SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 41-
42 (citing several surveys). Shepard confirms that employee drug use can affect absenteeism,
productivity, accidents, and employer liability.
291. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670-72 (1989). See
supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
292. See supra part II.C.
293. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629-32 (Ct. App. 1990).
294. Id.
295. Id. Luck's examples of safety-related jobs include: a transportation worker involved
with moving vehicles; a frontline (customs) official who might be corruptible (eg., with bribes);
an employee carrying a weapon; and a worker involved with volatile (nuclear) material. On the
other hand, an office employee is not a "safety risk when the chain of causation between mis-
conduct and injury is greatly attenuated." Id at 631. Luck borrows a federal standard from
Skinner and Von Raab: The employee must be directly involved, on the front line, where the
danger posed is immediate.
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the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment, no-reasonable-expectations
approach in Skinner and Von Raab.2 96 Luck declined to use the Califor-
nia search and seizure provision, however, and relied on the separate
state constitutional privacy right.2 97 Another California appeals court, in
Wilkinson, used the state search and seizure protection of privacy to up-
hold a drug test for non-safety-related positions.2 98 Generally, in both
federal and state cases, public safety is a compelling interest, but em-
ployer efficiency, without more, is not.
Substance abuse and other health problems cost an employer di-
rectly and indirectly. Poor attendance, careless errors, and erratic per-
formance299 have a direct impact on productivity. Impaired employees
cause more workplace accidents and injuries, and an employer's health
and/or liability insurance costs may be adversely affected. 3"
Many employers use drug testing or personality testing to reduce
worker theft of employer property from minor office supplies to major
trade secrets. Psychological profile tests are aimed at identifying appli-
cants with greater tendencies toward dishonesty, often through revela-
tion of intimate non-work-related information. Employees rarely have
challenged psychological tests as invasions of privacy. 301 An employer's
interest in preventing theft and its interest in promoting efficiency can
conffict when restricting employee access to supplies or information
could cause delays or inconvenience in interdepartmental interactions.
For example, the efficiency of allowing each worker access to his or her
own office supplies, despite isolated pilferage, might outweigh the added
bureaucratic layer of a supply department and its attendant paperwork.
On the other hand, the employer might need the regular tracking of sup-
plies for ordering, expense analysis for taxes, or other purposes.
296. Id. at 629-32.
297. d See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13, for the search and seizure provision; CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1, for the free-standing privacy provision.
298. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200-06 (Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990). This decision replaced the compelling interest test
with a mid-level balancing approach, discussed in detail, supra, in part III.C.2: Wilkinson
appears to be a maverick case in its selection of a mid-level test for an invasion of privacy as
extreme as a bodily intrusion. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07, also rejected a non-consti-
tutional claim that the drug testing violated state statutory prohibitions of medical testing that
is not meant "to determine fitness for a particular job or where necessary for health and safety
reasons." The court found that drug test results could indeed be "reasonably related" to job
performance.
299. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 418 (discussing "considerable peaks and
valleys" in performance).
300. Id. at 407, 418. Employers have also been held liable for negligence in screening their
employees. Id. at 407-08 (citing D.R.R. v. English Enter., LATV, 356 NW.2d 580 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1984)).
301. "Few states prohibit or restrict use of honesty or psychological profile tests." Id at
414. See infra note 317 (personality tests) and accompanying text; note 3!8 and accompanying
text (recent Soroka decision).
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Employers are generally permitted to search their own property,
"such as desks and lockers.""0 2 Such searches would come under search
and seizure scrutiny rather than under stand-alone privacy rights such as
California's, and thus would be analyzed in terms of employees' reason-
able expectations.3"3 Employees generally do have an expectation of pri-
vacy in their offices, 3" so the Fourth Amendment applies and its first
prong met. Beyond this point in the analysis, an employer can easily
claim a special need other than law enforcement.30 5 For example, a su-
pervisor may need work-related fies in an employee's desk after the em-
ployee goes home or when the employee is out sick.
More controversial are searches of vehicles on employer property or
of employee packages leaving the worksite. Courts have upheld these
too, although an employer who physically detains a worker against the
worker's will may incur tort liability for false imprisonment. 0 6
Employers are interested for many reasons, legitimate and not, in
private information about their workers. For various business reasons,
employers must maintain records to administer benefits, evaluate em-
ployees, decide promotions, determine salary adjustments, and track fi-
nancial and tax data. Federal statutes may mandate such record
keeping. For instance, OSHA requires documentation on workplace ac-
cidents, and Title VII demands records pertaining to possible age, gen-
der, and race discrimination in hiring and firing.307 "[H]ere . . .
employee privacy rights must be delicately balanced with the employer's
need to make legitimate, informed business decisions., 30 8 Administra-
tive needs for employees' private information also reflect important pub-
302. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 412.
303. See SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 206-15. See supra part II.B, discussing federal search
and seizure analyses. California courts use federal standards for state court application of the
exclusionary rule that enforces California's search and seizure provision. See supra note 202
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the two privacy protections in the California
constitution, see supra note 205 and accompanying text.
304. See, eg., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968).
SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 212, suggests that employers can counter this reasonable ex-
pectation. First employers should state in advance---in their employment contract, for in-
stance-that employees should not expect offices, desks, lockers, and other employer property
to be private. Second, employers should conduct periodic searches so that employees cannot
later claim that this policy became obsolete by disuse.
305. For a discussion of "special needs" exceptions and the balancing approach to the
second prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 210-15, discusses the use of privacy torts as alternatives to
actions based on search and seizure.
306. Lehr and Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 412.
307. Id. at 565-66 and nn.86-90, and statutory requirements cited therein. See generally
Rebecca A. Thacker & Stuart A. Youngblood, "Trends in Title VII Discrimination Legal
Theories: The Future of Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact," in MANAGING EM-
PLOYEE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILrrIES 83-95 (Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg., ed. 1989).
308. Decker, supra note 1, at 566.
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lic interests in worker health and safety, egalitarian employment, and
union representation.3 °9
Employers often want private information about an employee that is
neither required nor directly job-related. The higher a position is in a
company's hierarchy, the more personal commitment the company may
require. If a company is contemplating a promotion to a front-line man-
agement position, or a promotion from an hourly job to a salaried job, it
may have a special interest in an employee's capacity for commitment.31 °
The intangible personality traits contributing to employee commitment
or "attitude" are not easily assessed in an applicant interview, a con-
trolled setting that often proves the applicant's ability to master inter-
viewing techniques more than his or her aptitude for the position.311
Employers may find all information about an applicant or employee
"relevant and necessary in determining suitability for employment. Thus,
the employer feels it is important to know if the employee smokes mari-
juana at home, is a homosexual, or socializes with the 'wrong' kind of
people., 312 Long Beach, which banned polygraph exams as inherently
intrusive, listed some sample questions from an employee polygraph
exam:
One polygraph technician's manual contained the following ques-
tions for use in preemployment polygraph tests... : "Have you
ever suffered a nervous breakdown?... Have you ever filed for, or
collected workmen's compensation insurance from an on-the-job
injury?... Are you now or have you ever been a communist sym-
pathizer?" . . . A prospective firefighter who submitted to a poly-
graph examination was reportedly asked: "Have you had sex with
men? Have you had sex with animals? Have you touched a child
with sexual intent? How often do you masturbate? Do you cheat
on your wife?" 313
These are personal areas about which employers often have genuine-if
illegitimate-interests, and which implicate constitutional privacy rights.
Employers may have goals for workforce composition; they may
want ethnic homogeneity, for instance, because of personal prejudice, be-
cause they feel it will enhance teamwork, or because they perceive that
their clients demand it. Employers increasingly view employees as repre-
309. See id. at 552, 566.
310. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (Ct. App. 1990).
311. But see SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 134: "Good interviews offer many advantages....
[E]ach person communicates at several levels .... [including] gestures, posture, and eye con-
tact.... An observant, trained interviewer also can detect evasive responses or uneasiness
regarding certain areas of inquiry, and these should be investigated further."
312. Decker, supra note I, at 561.
313. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 665 n.ll
(Cal. 1986). As discussed below, such polygraph exams are unconstitutional invasions of the
California privacy right.
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sentatives for their company even when not at work.3 14 Public image
and goodwill have long been recognized as valuable business assets, 315
especially for employers engaged in fundraising. These pressures com-
bine to create a strong employer interest, legitimate or not, in employees'
non-workplace activities, such as bankruptcy, union involvement, gen-
eral lifestyle, sexual orientation, marital status, and political or religious
affiliations.316
Personality tests offer employers a method other than interviewing
to obtain sensitive information from job applicants. Two prototypes for
personality tests exist: the inventory-measure test, which catalogs the
test-taker's affinity toward certain activities, lifestyles, and attitudes; and
the projection test, which provides suggestive but open shapes or narra-
tives onto which the test-taker can project his or her own personality
traits.317 The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is
the most popular inventory-measure test. The Rorschach ink blot test is
a simple projective test; a more complex one might offer the test-taker a
short, unfinished story and ask him or her to complete it. Although job
applicants have rarely challenged personality screening tests on constitu-
tional privacy grounds, a unanimous state appeals panel recently limited
an employer's use of such a test to uncover either the sexual orientation
or religious beliefs of job applicants.318 The decision, which will be ap-
pealed, was expressly based on the California constitutional privacy
right. 319
Employers have various reasons for curiousity about their employ-
ees' lifestyles. Lifestyle may appear irrelevant to work performance, but
in some jobs requiring teamwork, it may affect compatability and hence
team effectiveness. An employer may also feel better able to attract busi-
ness and clients by presenting a certain employee profile to the public.
314. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 408.
315. See Cochran, supra note 104, at 563-64; Brunn, supra note 59, at 414-16.
316. Decker, supra note 1, at 564. Decker proposes that only non-workplace conduct that
will affect an employer's business affairs should be regulated by that employer. Id. at 579.
Privacy and confidentiality are distinct: A worker or individual has a privacy interest in
keeping certain information from the government or an employer in the first place; whereas the
government or other employer has an interest in keeping certain employment information
from unauthorized persons or from other employers. Id. at 562.
317. Decker, supra note 1, at 574 n.147.
318. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Ct. App. 1991); Reynolds Hold-
ing, Court Ruling Expands Rights in Workplace, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 29, 1991, at Al; Philip
Carrizosa, Employers' Psychological Test Rights Are Limited, DAILY J., Oct. 29, 1991, at 1, 9.
Target Stores, owned by Dayton Hudson, used a personality test on applicants that included
such true-false questions as "I believe in the second coming of Christ" and "I am very strongly
attracted to members of my own sex." The state appeals panel found that "[w]hile Target
unquestionably has an interest in employing emotionally stable persons to be SSOs [store se-
curity officers], testing applicants about their religious beliefs and sexual orientation does not
further this interest." See supra note 266 on the nexus test.
319. Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82, 86.
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Von Raab320 accorded more weight to public
confidence in the company's product or service than did a California
court in Luck.321 Company image partially accounts for a "philosophi-
cal [trend toward] the concept that employees represent their employers
twenty-four hours a day," so employers have a legitimate interest in their
workers non-work activities.322 For example, an employee's termination
for "open adultery" did not violate that employee's federal constitutional
privacy right in Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library.323 If specific non-
work considerations are integral to employment decisions, the employer
should notify its employees in advance to insulate itself from due process
attacks,324 unless of course those considerations are illegal ones such as
gender or race.
C. Individual Interests and Employee Interests
1. Due Process, Notice, and Stated Policies
An employee needs to know what performance the employer ex-
pects and what behavior may lead to discipline.3 25 Random punishment
or testing can raise issues of procedural due process if an employer acts
without notifying employees in advance.326 An accused employee de-
serves some complaint process in which he or she may offer a mitigating
explanation or legitimate denial.327 Many companies immediately fire an
320. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659-61, 668-71
(1989) (The Customs Director implemented testing, despite evidence of virtually no drug use
in his department, because Customs agents' public image of integrity is important in the "drug
crisis.").
321. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (Ct. App. 1990) ("creat-
ing a drug-free environment... and ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the railroad
industry" are not compelling interests that justify invasion of the California right to privacy).
322. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 408.
323. 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
324. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 415-17. Both Wilkinson v. Times Mirror
Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168
(1990), and Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2, illustrate the importance courts place on providing
advance notice of an employment practice.
325. REDEKER, supra note 266, at 25-27, 36-37, 54-58. Using "due process" not in a
strictly legal sense, Redeker generalizes that "some kind of notice of employer expectations
must exist prior to discipline, if the employees are to receive due process and if the system is to
have widespread employee acceptance." Id. at 27.
Giving such notice can help an employer at subsequent labor arbitrations. Id at 25, 36-37,
51; William R. Hutchison & Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg., "Positive Discipline: A Nonpuni-
tive Approach to Managing Human Resources," in MANAGING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILITIES 106-07 (Chimezie A.B. Osigweh, Yg., ed. 1989).
326. See Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct.
App. 1984) (IBM policy did not ban the type of relationship for which plaintiff employee was
fired, and her supervisor gave her no advance warning); Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (drug
testing upheld partially because job applicants knew of testing in advance).
327. ETihe rights of the employee.., include... the right to prompt and specific
notice of the need for change; an opportunity to improve; fair and consistent treat-
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employee who tests positive for drug use, despite possible test inaccura-
cies caused by sample contamination, mislabelling, or false positives.32 8
Employee discharge without demonstrable grounds can be actionable, so
employers must be careful about jumping to conclusions, even if only to
cover themselves.329
An employer can give notice of possible privacy intrusions by adopt-
ing formal policies and publishing them, for instance, in its employee
manual. A clear policy can tip the balance in favor of an employer's
invasion of privacy, such as Matthew Bender's drug testing of job appli-
cants in Wilkinson, because the advance notice can defeat employees'
reasonable expectations of privacy.330 Such a policy must not, however,
be openly discriminatory,331 or so intrusive as to tip the balance in the
opposite direction.332
Failure to observe its own company policy can rebound against an
employer, as it did in the California decision Rulon-Miller v. Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp.333 In this case, defendant IBM fired
plaintiff employee, ostensibly for a romantic liaison with a competitor's
employee, although no harm to IBM was shown or, the court felt, was
ment; maintenance of one's dignity and self-esteem; clear and reasonable rules and
requirements; the opportunity to mount a defense and to appeal to a neutral party.
Hutchison & Osigweh, supra note 325, at 109. See also Michael J. Kavanagh, "How'm I
Doin'? I Have a Need and a Right to Know," in MANAGING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND RE-
SPONSIBILrES 182 (Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg., ed. 1989).
328. Landis, supra note 290, at 553-58.
329. Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 104, at 411-13, 417-18, give the example that an
employee should be fired or disciplined because the employee showed deception on a poly-
graph test when asked about pilferage, not because he or she is a thief. Their article, which is
written for management, uncharacteristically recommends that employers not threaten termi-
nation "unless [the employee] confesses to personal involvement." Id. at 417. See also
REDEKER, supra note 266, at 97-104, on the erosion of the common law rule of at-will employ-
ment; see also infra part IV.C.4, for a discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
330. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204. See also supra note 263 and accompanying text;
Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg. & Marcia P. Miceli, "The Challenge of Employee Rights and
Responsibilities in Organizations," in MANAGING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
4-7 (Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg., ed. 1989); Brunn, supra note 59, at 397, 402.
331. A federal court distinguished between a situation where an employer's stated policy
discriminated against unmarried mothers, Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 507
F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), and a situation when an employer fires one particular couple for
conduct disapproved of by the community. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F.
Supp. 1328, 1332 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
332. Eg., O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986) (although
the employment contract and personnel manual forbade drug use, the company was not there-
fore allowed to make a "highly offensive" investigation-by polygraph-to enforce its policy).
333. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1984). See also Bratt v. International Business Machines
Corp., 785 F.2d 352 (1st Cir. 1986) (IBM's stated policy against disclosure of employees' pri-
vate medical information affected plaintiff employee's reasonable expectation of privacy, in an
intrusion-into-seclusion tort action); Howard A. Nunes, Comment, Bratt v. International Busi-
ness Machines, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 337 (1984).
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probable. 334 The termination contravened two company policies: "strict
regard for [an employee's] right to personal privacy," as described un-
equivocally in a lengthy policy announcement from CEO Tom Watson,
Jr. 3 3 5 ; and an aggressive promotion policy, for which plaintiff's glowing
record qualified her.336 No company conflict-of-interest policy extended
to non-business romance.337 The appeals court analogized to contract
law, found an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
opined that "the fair dealing portion of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is at least the right of an employee to the benefit of rules and
regulations adopted for his or her protection. ' 338
2. Employees' Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
As observed above, federal constitutional standards for reasonable
expectations of privacy, under a Fourth Amendment analysis, have been
significantly reduced between Katz in 1967 and Skinner and Von Raab in
1989.139 If a searcher can show any special need at all, the Court will
balance the searcher's need for the information against the searchee's pri-
vacy rights. Individualized suspicion, let alone probable cause, is no
longer necessary, as long as the searcher can demonstrate a good reason
to dispense with individualized suspicion. Finally, an employee's expec-
tations of privacy are reduced in the employment setting, in civil cases,
and if the job entails any particular danger or susceptibility to
corruption.34
California's Proposition 8, passed in 1982, mandated that in a crimi-
nal search and seizure context, federal minimum standards rather than
California constitutional standards must govern the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence.341 In re Lance W. upheld Prop. 8's amendment to the
California exclusionary rule,342 and subsequent cases have adopted fed-
eral guidelines for determining what constitutes a search.343 This re-
334. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32.
335. Id. at 530.
336. Id. at 527-28.
337. Id. at 530-31.
338. Id. at 529-30.
339. See supra part II.B.
340. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218, 224 (1984) (stating that employee has reduced
expectation of privacy when on job). See Reamey, supra note 57, at 317-22 (pervasive "special
needs" exception).
341. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985).
342. Id.
343. People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 392 (Cal. 1983) ("In the search and seizure context,
the Article I, Section I 'privacy' clause has never been held to establish a broader protection
than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or Article I, Section 13
of the California Constitution.").
Presumably, results such as that in People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 747 (Cal. 1979), would
no longer be possible: Blair found phone records admissible under the federal Fourth Amend-
quirement does not extend to civil cases and only applies in search and
seizure contexts where California Constitution Article I, Section 13,
would govern. Thus, the California free-standing privacy right in Article
I, Section 1, remains untouched. The resulting difference is striking.
Luck found drug testing unconstitutional under the free-standing privacy
right,345 whereas Wilkinson went even further than Skinner and Von
Raab to uphold drug testing of applicants for non-safety-related jobs
under a search and seizure analysis. 3"
What are an employee's reasonable expectations of privacy in the
workplace? California case law supports the following general parame-
ters: if unrelated to payment of salary or benefits, information about an
employee's finances and personal credit, or about health, especially his or
her mental health, should remain private; an employee's bodily integrity
should not be violated unless the employer meets a strict scrutiny test
such as the Bagley test; and an employee's lifestyle away from the job
should remain beyond the scrutiny of the employer.347 Conversely, an
employee should not reasonably expect privacy in communications on
the employer's property, such as a company phone or computer message
system, and an employer should be allowed to search employee packages
leaving the workplace if the employer can show individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing.3 4
ment (following Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)), but inadmissible under CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 13.
344. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not
be violated .... "
345. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 (Ct. App. 1990). See also
Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663-66 (Cal. 1986).
346. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989), review denied, 1989 Cal.
App. LEXIS 1168 (1990). Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 82-86 (Ct.
App. 1991), criticizes Wilkinson's disregard of clear California precedent in Wilkinson's use of
search-and-seizure reasonableness balancing, rather than Bagley strict scrutiny. See supra part
III.C.
347. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402,410-11 (Ct. App. 1988),
review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (1990), adopted Bagley's strict scrutiny. Bagley v. Washington
Township Hosp. Dist., 421 P.2d 409 (Cal. 1966), required that the tester (in Hill, the NCAA)
show a compelling reason to test, which reason "manifestly outweighs" the testees' privacy
interests; the testing must also be as narrowly tailored as it can be and still achieve the tester's
interest. The NCAA did not show significant drug use among student testees, Hill, 273 Cal.
Rptr. at 414-15, 422; or that drug testing would protect students' health and safety, id. at 417-
18; or even that the banned drugs enhanced performance (the causal nexus), id. at 418-20. The
student athletes, in contrast, had strong privacy interests in the confidentiality of, and control
over, their own medical treatment, and in their own off-site conduct, id. at 416-17. In addi-
tion, the drug testing program was too broad, and ignored narrower alternate approaches such
as drug education, or testing only with reasonable suspicion. Id. at 421-22; Cochran, supra
note 104, at 546-52.
348. But see Brunn, supra note 59, at 397, 402 ("employees often have an expectation of
privacy with respect to phone calls, cars, lockers, and legal activities in their homes").
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California decisions have emphasized the individual privacy interest
in financial records, which provide "'a virtual current biography'" of a
person, because they "may reveal his habits, his opinions, his tastes, and
political views, as well as his movements and financial affairs." 349 A
checking account or credit card ledger is indeed a road map to its
holder's lifestyle outside the workplace. If an employee's habits-messi-
ness and disorganization, for example--or beliefs affect his or her per-
formance, they should be addressed by an employer only in the
performance context.35 0
Privacy of medical, especially mental and psychological, informa-
tion has been perhaps the most protected area of privacy in California.35'
The state supreme court disallowed polygraphs of employees in Long
Beach, contending that "[i]f there is a quintessential zone of human pri-
vacy it is the mind," and that polygraphs can access "repressed beliefs,
guilt feelings and fantasized events. ' 352 The seminal case on the free-
standing privacy right, White v. Davis, quoted language from ballot argu-
ments for the privacy amendment that described the amendment's pro-
tection of the privacy of "our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions,
our personalities. '35 3
3. The White v. Davis Four Mischiefs
In White v. Davis, the supreme court identified the four primary
"mischiefs" that the privacy amendment intended to remedy:354 (1)
"government snooping" and secret collection of data; (2) "overbroad col-
lection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government
and business interests" 355; (3) "improper use of information," that is, us-
ing it for a purpose other than the purpose for which the information was
349. People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 745 (Cal. 1979) (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court,
529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974)).
350. As discussed above, good management addresses behavior and performance instead of
underlying attitude. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
351. See Hill, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 417; Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 548 (Ct.
App. 1986).
352. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663-65 (Cal.
1986). The court also noted that the coercive circumstances tend to compel a tested employee
to answer, and if the employee remains silent, the instruments record a psychological re-
sponse-in effect, no answer is interpreted as a self-incriminatory answer.
Because of intrusiveness and inaccuracy, many jurisdictions regulate or prohibit employ-
ment use of polygraphs. Brunn, supra note 59, at 407. Polygraph accuracy rates range from
70% to 90%. Using an average rate of 75%, if 100 employees out of 1000 were dishonest, the
results would be the following: "225 honest people and 75 dishonest people test as liars, for a
ratio of three to one; 25 dishonest people slip through undetected." Id at 407 n.168.
353. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 (Cal. 1975); Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663 (Cal.
1986).
354. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975).
355. See Brunn, supra note 59, at 390 (exponential spread of available information on
employees).
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obtained356; and (4) "lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of ex-
isting records."
Simple workplace procedures can alleviate the effects of these four
mischiefs. Commentators have suggested that employers collect only
necessary information, ensure that "only those parties who need to know
... have access to the information," and afford employees access to their
own fies, so they can correct or explain errors.3 57 An employer can also
purge its files regularly, and former employees' records are therefore not
retained after the employer needs them, because the ability to leave one's
past behind is an important privacy interest.358
Finally, employers can erect informational barriers between depart-
ments, to minimize the spread of private information about employees to
only those who need to know. 359 Porten found an actionable invasion of
constitutional privacy in the "'improper use of information, . . . for ex-
ample,... the [unauthorized] disclosure of it to some third party.' ,,31
Revelation of private information may limit unfairly an employee's op-
portunities for promotion or other growth.3 6 1
356. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986) (California constitu-
tional privacy "protects one from the improper use of information which has been properly
obtained") (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 234).
357. Brunn, supra note 59, at 391; Decker, supra note 1, at 575-77.
358. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (Regarding
publication of a crime committed by plaintiff 11 years earlier, the court stated, "It would be a
crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once public never becomes private again."); Kinsey v.
Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 613 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating right to leave behind traumatic mur-
der trial, in which plaintiff was acquitted).
359. Decker, supra note 1, at 575-77.
360. Porten v. University of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting White
v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975)).
Defamation or privacy tort relief may also be available for disclosures to third parties,
though this is beyond this Note's scope. See Decker, supra note I, at 570-72; Lehr & Mid-
dlebrooks, supra note 104, at 409-11; Landis, supra note 290, at 562-67.
361. Decker, supra note 1, at 554-55: "[s]ensitive ... information [that] may reveal the
employee's innermost beliefs, ethical attitudes, and outside interests and activities ... may
cause co-workers to form incorrect and unfavorable opinions of the employee which may affect
his standing and reputation inside and outside the workplace."
Ironically, employers are increasingly reluctant to provide any information-even positive
recommendations-about former employees. Predictably, employees have brought defamation
and invasion of privacy actions against former employers, for negative recommendations from
those employers. But employers are now also concerned about liability arising from favorable
recommendations of former employees. In case a future employer relies on such recommenda-
tions and the employee fails to live up to them, the future employer could conceivably sue the
former employer for misrepresentation or for negligent failure to investigate the employee's
background. SHEPARD, supra note 1, at 135-39, discusses this trend and various strategies for
employers to avoid such liability. The simplest way around the problem is for an employee to
release the former and/or prospective employer, in writing, from all liability stemming from
the disclosure of confidential information.
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4. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
California has recognized an additional reasonable expectation for
employees, inherent in the employment relationship: an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.3 62 This covenant can abrogate the
common law assumption of at-will employment, so an employer must
show a good reason for terminating an employee. 363 In Luck, for exam-
ple, defendant railroad breached its implied covenant to its employees by
firing plaintiff employee for refusing a random, suspicionless drug test.
Plaintiff's continued good evaluations and promotions contributed to her
reasonable expectation that she would not be fired but for good cause.
364
Absent statutory provisions to the contrary, employment at-will is the
default position.365 Luck found a presumption of at-will employment in
California, 366 but identified several factors that might interact to over-
come this presumption and indicate an implied contract to terminate
only for good cause: "consideration, any express contract terms, the em-
ployer's personnel policies and practices, the employee's longevity of ser-
vice, the employer's actions or communications reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and industry practices. 3 67
Rulon-Miller contended that California courts had altered the pre-
sumption of employment at-will and that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was now the default position.3 68 The Rulon-Miller
court considered an abusive termination of plaintiff IBM employee, os-
tensibly for dating a competitor's employee.369 It determined that the
discharge was not for legitimate business reasons, because plaintiff em-
ployee had a glowing record of evaluations and promotions; she had no
access to confidential IBM information, so her dating did not jeopardize
IBM nor create any conflict of interest; and IBM's disregard of its stated
policy of respect for employees' personal privacy constituted unfair deal-
362. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990); Rulon-Miller
v. International Business Machines Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1984); Decker, supra
note 1, at 557.
363. See REDEKER, supra note 266, at 97-104 (discussing erosion of the common law de-
fault of at-will employment).
364. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
365. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(holding that courts should not "intervene" where at-will employment); Decker, supra note 1,
at 555-57 (including list of various federal statutory exceptions to employment at will); see also
Richard W. Humphreys et al., Positive Discipline from the Worker's Perspective, in MANAG-
ING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 117-19 (Chimezie A. B. Osigweh, Yg., ed.
1989).
366. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
367. Id. at 625 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988)).
368. Rulon-Miller v. International Business Machines Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 529 (Ct.
App. 1984) (citing Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal.
1984); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980)).
369. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
ing.3 70 Plaintiff's supervisor evidently had known of the dating relation-
ship for some time and had reassured plaintiff that it was not a problem.
Then without warning, the supervisor used the dating as "a pretext" for
a callous termination.371
The general principles from Luck and Rulon-Miller are that in Cali-
fornia, an employee who is doing a good job, according to his or her
employer's evaluations, raises, and promotions, has a reasonable expecta-
tion not to be fired without a good reason. And if the grounds for such a
firing involve substantial privacy interests, the reason must be
compelling. 372
V. Conclusions and Suggestions for Change
Many ways to protect workplace privacy follow from the foregoing
discussion. In search and seizure analysis, which federal courts use to
address workplace privacy, Fourth Amendment protection could be re-
turned to its level in Katz, 373 which genuinely required probable cause for
most searches. California could redevelop its own stricter, independent
search and seizure standards.
Locating the analysis in search and seizure, rather than in a free-
standing privacy right, defines the level of scrutiny. The scrutiny applied
can decide the case, as demonstrated by the contrast between Luck's in-
validation of employer drug testing absent a compelling employer inter-
est,374 and Wilkinson's balancing analysis that upheld drug testing for
non-safety-related positions in a civil context.375
The federal, substantive due process, privacy right could be ex-
panded to encompass non-traditional rights that are fundamental. Fi-
nally, a federal privacy right amendment, while politically unlikely,
would establish national uniformity in protecting a right that deserves a
constitutional guarantee. Such a federal amendment could be designed
370. Id at 527-33.
371. Id. at 528-29. In fact, the court upheld the plaintiff's verdict for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, which requires behavior "so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all
bounds of decency." Id at 533-35.
372. Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 666, 669-70
(Cal. 1986) (requiring compelling interest, and other elements of Bagley test, such as narrow
tailoring and lack of better alternatives); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr.
618, 629-30 (Ct. App. 1990). But see Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194,
202-03 (Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990) (following Schmidt
dicta to discard need for compelling interest). See supra part III.C, for a discussion of Wilkin-
son's balancing.
373. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
374. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 629-32.
375. Wilkinson, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 202-03.
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like the Thirteenth Amendment 37 6 to directly limit private and individual
action.
A. Choose the Free-Standing Privacy Analysis Over the Search-and-
Seizure Privacy Analysis
Courts have addressed both federal and state constitutional privacy
rights under either a free-standing privacy right or the privacy rights in-
herent in constitutional protections against unreasonable search and
seizure. Because courts have extended the federal privacy right implied
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only to a
very limited number of substantive rights, the Supreme Court has used a
Fourth Amendment analysis for workplace privacy. 377 The jurispruden-
tial balance struck in Kat 378 between the legitimate needs of the searcher
and those of the searchee, was distorted by Skinner and Von Raab's spe-
cial-need exception not only to the basic probable cause requirement, but
to any requirement for individualized suspicion.379 A blood or urine test
is one of the most intrusive personal searches imaginable, and even a
lenient balancing approach, with understandable exceptions for exigent
circumstances 38° or good faith,38 1 should require at least individualized
suspicion. Justice Marshall's Skinner dissent shows cogently how to ac-
commodate both the employer's interest in obtaining samples before any
drug metabolites have passed through the employee's body, and the em-
ployee's interest in not being invaded without probable cause and a war-
rant: Allow the initial search of collecting the sample on a special-need
exception if exigent circumstances can be shown by the employer, then
preserve the sample untested until the employer secures a warrant to per-
form the second search of actual laboratory analysis.382
Current drug tests do not test for on-the-job impairment 38 3 but for
recent use, whether on or off the job. The intrusiveness of such an inva-
sion into employees' private lives and bodies384 should require a strong
showing by the testing employer that off-the-job conduct affects employ-
376. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States
... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Because there is no mention of state action, this amendment
is construed to apply directly to private action.
California's explicit privacy right also needs no state action. See supra note 276 and ac-
companying text.
377. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
378. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
379. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-75.
380. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
381. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
382. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 641-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 652 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 617; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989).
ees' work performances." 5 Procedures to mitigate the invasiveness 38 6
seem trivial when balancing drug testing policy under the Fourth
Amendment. Recommending that the urination be unobserved, or hav-
ing samples analyzed by an independent lab, does not remove the offense
of a suspicionless invasion. Personal medical3 7 and psychological infor-
mation,3 8 financial data, sexual orientation, and off-the-job conduct that
does not affect employees' productivity or attendance,38 9 should be pro-
tected zones of privacy.
The testing employer should bear the burden of demonstrating that
it is not testing to determine lifestyle characteristics of its employees or
potential employees. Unequal access to evidence militates for a shift in
the burden of proof here. Because tested employees have no way of
knowing what tests their employer actually had run on their samples, the
burden should be on the employer to prove that no tests infringed on
protected areas of privacy.390
California courts interpreted that state's constitutional search and
seizure provision more broadly than its federal counterpart, until Propo-
sition 8 passed in 1982.391 Proposition 8's unequivocal mandate was that
California's judge-made exclusionary rule conform with federal stan-
dards for the admission and exclusion of evidence.392 It did not, how-
ever, require that California conform all its search and seizure analysis
under state constitution Article I, Section 13, to federal minimum stan-
dards.393 Thus California is left with dual paths of independent state
grounds: State courts can use California's explicit privacy guarantee in
Article I, Section 1, instead of its search and seizure clause394; or they
385. See Decker supra note 1, at 579; Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 402, 416-18 (Ct. App. 1988), review granted, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. 1990).
386. Eg., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 672; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n.2; Wilkinson v. Times
Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 204 (Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS
1168 (1990).
387. The Skinner majority acknowledges that an employer might "learn certain private
medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose" through a blood or urine sample.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 n.7.
388. See Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 673 (Cal.
1986).
389. See Decker supra note 1, at 562-64; Lehr & Middlebrooks supra note 104, at 418;
Brunn supra note 59, at 401-02.
390. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 54 (Ct. App.
1989), put the burden on the people (that is, on the privacy invader) to prove that it had a
compelling interest, and that its invasion was as narrow as possible.
391. Compare, eg., People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 747-48 (Cal. 1979) with In re Lance W.,
694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985).
392. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985).
393. Id. at 752-53; People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 398-99 (Cal. 1983) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
394. E.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (Ct. App. 1990).
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13 (search and seizure provision).
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can analyze searches and their reasonableness more broadly than the
Supreme Court's current lax balancing.
The level of scrutiny depends on the analytical framework chosen:
Both the federal implied privacy right and California's explicit free-
standing right consistently receive strict scrutiny,3 95 because the rights
implicated are fundamental or inalienable. 96 Thus, when the Luck ap-
peals court found drug testing of a non-safety employee unconstitutional,
although its balancing of employer and employee interests was reminis-
cent of Skinner, the California court followed the overwhelming state
precedent in applying strict scrutiny. 97 The maverick appeals court that
decided Wilkinson declined to follow this precedent, selecting instead an
intermediate-level test and thus dipping below even the federal minimum
to uphold drug testing for non-safety-related positions.398 Common
sense, and federal and state precedent indicate that privacy is among our
most fundamental liberty interests, and its violation must be justified by a
truly compelling interest. 99
B. Expand the Scope of Fundamental Rights
Two simple, though politically unlikely, avenues exist for expansion
of federal constitutional privacy rights. The first would be to include
more rights under the protective wing of the implied due process guaran-
tee. The current list of substantive rights is narrowly limited to hetero-
sexual marital, procreative, and child rearing choices.' The sanctity of
personal privacy against bodily invasions such as drug tests, is not
novel."°1 A worker's medical condition, political beliefs, sexual orienta-
tion, and lifestyle choices should be included as areas of fundamental
privacy to which an employer should gain access only under the most
compelling, demonstrably work-related circumstances. 4°2 California and
395. E.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); Long Beach
City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 666, 668-70 (Cal. 1986).
396. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (privacy
provision).
397. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 629-32. See Long Beach, 719 P.2d at 668-70; White v. Davis,
533 P.2d 222, 233-34 (Cal. 1975); Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549-50 (Ct. App.
1986).
398. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202-03 (Ct. App. 1989), review
denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 1168 (1990). See supra part III.C, for a more detailed discus-
sion of the level of test used in Wilkinson.
399. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 82-86 (Ct. App. 1991).
400. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
152-53. See also supra part II.A.3.
401. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 179. See also
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 266 and accompanying text, about the "nexus" test, under which test-
ing is allowed only if the reason behind the testing is directly job-related.
other states have repeatedly found constitutional protection for privacy
rights left unguarded by the federal constitution. 40 3 This is partially be-
cause California courts have been more expansive at a policy level and
partially because California's free-standing constitutional guarantee is
explicit.
C. Amend the Federal Constitution to Protect Privacy Explicitly
The second avenue would be to amend the federal constitution, ad-
ding an explicit, inalienable privacy right analogous to California's. Such
an amendment would encounter strenuous political opposition, especially
from anti-abortion factions.' But modern proliferation of personal in-
formation and concomitant government bureaucracy might nevertheless
spark popular support for protection of these crucial rights at a constitu-
tional level.
A privacy amendment should be designed, like the Thirteenth
Amendment, to guard directly against private, individual action, to obvi-
ate the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment." 5 Cali-
fornia's free-standing privacy right is self-executing,' because it is
explicit and because state constitutions delineate their governments' ple-
nary power, whereas the federal constitution enumerates its govern-
ment's limited power." 7  In the alternative, if a federal privacy
amendment were still to require state action, the Supreme Court should
assess realistically the degree of government involvement in such activi-
ties as federally designed and funded Medicaid facilities." 8 The Court
must also revive its government-function and symbiosis theories,409 espe-
cially where a nominally private entity like the utility in Jackson clearly
403. Eg., compare Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
1981) (government funding for abortions constitutionally protected) with Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (government funding for abortions not constitutionally protected); com-
pare Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990) (using strict
scrutiny privacy analysis to find employee drug testing unconstitutional) with National Treas-
ury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (using lenient Fourth Amendment
balancing to uphold constitutionality of employee drug testing); compare City of Santa Bar-
bara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980) (overturning government restrictions on cohabita-
tion of unrelated persons, as violative of constitutional right to privacy) with Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding no constitutional privacy right to live with unre-
lated persons).
404. The politics of ratifying a federal privacy amendment are beyond the scope of this
Note.
405. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
406. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975); Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr.
545, 548-50 (Ct. App. 1986); Porten v. University of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct. App.
1976).
407. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 815 (Wash. 1986).
408. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1020-25 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
409. See Strickland supra note 110, at 617-26; and supra part II.C.
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provides a public entitlement owed to citizens by modem government,
and is hence acting in a governmental capacity.41°
An explicit federal privacy right would offend many proponents of
states' rights. Our federal system allows states to construct locally and
regionally responsive legal protections on top of a federal floor.411 Cali-
fornia's privacy right is a relatively successful example of this process at
work.412 Regionalism's benefit can also be its drawback, however, as lo-
cal prejudices can create inequitable differences between states and make
unpopular individuals or groups legally vulnerable. Privacy is a funda-
mental enough right to deserve vigorous, uniform, 1 3 national protection.
The California Constitution and state courts have for the most part
demonstrated that greater workplace privacy can be accomplished with
respect for the interests of employer and employee alike, 14 and federal
jurisprudence needs to catch up.
410. Providing electricity is quintessentially and "traditionally identified with the State
through universal public regulation or ownership." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 371 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
411. See Brennan, supra note 7, at 548-51.
412. Compare, eg., Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
1981) (government funding for abortions constitutionally protected) with Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980) (government funding for abortions not constitutionally protected). See
Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990) (deciding that although state supreme court
generally defers to federal standards, state highest court must be final arbiter of state constitu-
tional guarantees, as long as no conflict with federal constitution).
413. For a discussion of the benefits of national uniformity, see Brennan, supra note 7, at
548-50; State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812, 815 (Wash. 1986).
414. E.g., Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990).
